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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model of how speci¯c legal rules a®ect the types of
contracts managed care organizations (\MCOs") use to compensate physicians. In
addition, the analysis provides insights into how physician treatment decisions and
the rate of medical malpractice lawsuits react to di®erent legal rules. In particular,
the model predicts that outcomes in jurisdictions forcing MCOs to disclose physician
contract terms to patients di®er from those that do not. Contracts vary depending
on the disclosure rule and how treatment costs relate to expected damages and
litigation costs. Moreover, the model predicts that jurisdictions forcing contract
disclosure observe higher rates of treatment and lower rates of lawsuits.
The model's results also provide insights into how expected damages a®ect treat-
ment and litigation decisions. Using these insights, an e±cient damage rule is con-
structed and then compared to two commonly used damage rules to illuminate the
rules' ine±ciencies. Finally, it is shown that, regardless of the disclosure rule, treat-
ment and litigation decisions do not depend on whether the patient can sue only the
physician, only the MCO or both for medical malpractice. MCO contract choices,
however, do vary with the composition of the group of potential defendants.
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National health expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product have been in-
creasing steadily. They rose from roughly 9% in 1980 to approximately 14% in 2001 and
are projected to increase to approximately 17% by the year 2010.1 The signi¯cant and
growing size of the health care industry coupled with its inherent market imperfections
justify the voluminous literature related to it.
How judicial and legislative rules a®ect behavior in health care markets has been
widely studied.2 Despite the attention devoted to this ¯eld, our understanding of the
intricate interactions between legal rules and behavior remains blurred. Most studies
focus narrowly on one or two actors and do not account for how legal rules a®ect the
contracts managed care organizations (\MCOs") use to compensate physicians. These
e®ects are important because they in°uence treatment decisions made by physicians and
litigation decisions made by injured patients. The purpose of this paper is to take another
step toward clarifying exactly how legal rules a®ect behavior in health care markets by
including a wide range of actors and analyzing how the behavior of one a®ects the choices
of the others. Understanding these interactions aids in discovering whether legal rules
achieve desired goals and lead to e±cient outcomes.
Even though judges and legislators create legal rules with speci¯c goals in mind, they
might perversely a®ect the behavior of actors they in°uence. For example, courts might
assume that decreasing damage awards will reduce the number of lawsuits ¯led. This
might not be the case, however. When courts reduce damages, those with legal duties
might bene¯t by taking fewer precautions even though they might face lawsuits if injuries
result from their negligent acts. This, in turn, might lead to an increase in injuries and
a resulting increase in lawsuits. Unless law makers consider the incentives of all actors
involved, predictions of the e®ects of changes in the law could be misguided. Furthermore,
unless we have a clear understanding of the e®ects of current legal rules on behavior in
health care markets any normative analysis of these legal rules is severely limited. For
these reasons, a theoretical investigation of how current legal rules a®ect behavior in
health care markets is an important step toward successful legal reform.
1These statistics were reported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, O±ce of the Actuary,
National Health Statistics Group. Information is posted on the web at http://cms.hhs.gov/researchers/.
2See Danzon [15] and McGuire [48] for recent literature reviews.
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a®ect behavior in health care markets. Speci¯cally, the paper develops a game theoretic
model to provide insight into how certain legal rules a®ect contracting between physicians
and \MCOs," physician treatment choices and litigation decisions by injured patients. In
the ¯rst stage of the model, the MCO considers the cost of compliant treatment3 and
expected damages from a medical malpractice lawsuit and chooses a contract to obtain
medical services for its insured patient (in need of medical treatment). Knowing the
contract terms selected by the MCO, the physician then determines whether he will
provide compliant treatment to the insured patient. Compliant treatment is assumed
to be more costly than non-compliant treatment, but results in a positive outcome for the
patient more often than non-compliant treatment. Given the physician's action, Nature
chooses whether the patient will enjoy a positive outcome or su®er a negative outcome. If
a positive outcome is realized, the game ends. If a negative outcome occurs, the patient,
not able to ascertain whether the physician provided appropriate medical care, decides
whether to ¯le a costly negligence suit for medical malpractice. If a suit is ¯led, the court
hears the case and rules on the issue of liability.4
The paper focuses mainly on how health care market actors react to disclosure rules.
Some states require MCOs to disclose to their insured members the contract terms they
use to compensate physicians for providing medical services to their members. As of
2001, 21 states require MCOs to disclose to enrollees physician compensation methods
used (Miller and Sage [51]). Although mandatory contract disclosure is intended to pro-
vide prospective enrollees with information when choosing health plans, it also a®ects
MCO contract choices, physician treatment decisions and litigation decisions by injured
patients.5 Therefore, the analysis is performed assuming patients can observe the contract
terms and again assuming they cannot. The results provide insights into the e®ects of
disclosure laws on the behavior of health care market actors.
By analyzing a model of the interactions among actors in health care markets, I ¯nd
that the relationship between the cost of compliant treatment and expected damages de-
termines the MCO's contract choice. Also, the contract disclosure rule (i.e., whether the
3Compliant treatment is treatment that meets the legal standard of care. For those not familiar with
legal terminology, \standard of care" refers to the level of e®ort such that if an actor's e®ort level is equal
to or above the speci¯ed level, the court does not assign liability to that actor for any related injuries.
4Of course, a settlement might occur before this stage. See infra Section 4.3 for a discussion of this
issue.
5See Hall [30] for discussion of reasons for mandating contract disclosure.
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ing damage awards exceed litigation costs, when contracts are observable and expected
damages are high relative to the expected cost of compliant treatment, the MCO employs
a standard fee-for-service contract with full reimbursement for cost and no ¯xed payment.
The physician will compliantly treat with a probability high enough so that the patient
will never sue, and the patient never sues. If damages are low relative to the expected cost
of compliant treatment, the MCO prefers a capitated contract with no reimbursement for
cost and a positive ¯xed payment to compensate the physician for exposure to liability.
The physician will not provide compliant treatment and the patient will sue with certainty
if a negative outcome is realized.
Actors behave somewhat di®erently when the patient is unable to observe the contract
terms. In this case, when the court sets damages high relative to the cost of compliant
treatment, the MCO prefers a fee-for-service contract with partial reimbursement and a
positive ¯xed payment to cover the physician's exposure to liability. The physician will
compliantly treat at a probability high enough so that the patient does not sue with
certainty. Unlike in the observable contract case, the patient will sue with some positive
probability. Injured patients sue with a strictly positive probability because the patient is
unable to observe the contract terms and so must use the threat of a lawsuit to ensure that
the MCO encourages the physician to compliantly treat with some positive probability.
When the court sets damages low relative to the cost of compliant treatment, however,
actors behave as they would in the observable contract case. That is, the MCO employs
a capitated contract with no reimbursement for the cost of treatment but a positive
¯xed payment to compensate the physician for exposure to liability. The physician never
provides compliant treatment and the patient sues with certainty.
In addition, the model shows that, for any damage rule, regimes in which contracts are
observable by patients will enjoy a lower rate of claims ¯led and a higher rate of compliant
treatment than regimes in which contracts are not observable by patients. These results
follow directly from the reasoning provided previously. First, consider the claims rate .
When contracts are observable, the patient can infer the physician's strategy based on
the outcome and the contract terms. Therefore, upon realizing a negative outcome, the
patient will never ¯le a claim if the contract is fee-for-service and will ¯le a claim with
certainty if the contract is capitated. On the other hand, if the patient is unable to observe
6
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the cost of compliant treatment is low relative to expected damages, the patient ¯nds
it necessary to sue with some positive probability so that the MCO has an incentive to
induce compliant treatment. Without the threat of a lawsuit, the MCO simply would
never provide the physician with an incentive to meet the legal standard of care when
making the treatment decision. For these reasons, the claims rate is higher in a regime
in which contracts are not observable compared to a regime in which patients are able to
observe them.
Next, consider the likelihood of compliant treatment under each regime. When the
patient is able to observe the contract terms and the cost of compliant treatment is low
relative to damages, the patient will never sue. Therefore, if the MCO induces compliant
treatment, it will incur costs for the provision of treatment only. In contrast, if contracts
are not observable, the patient always sues with some positive probability. This implies
that if the MCO induces compliant treatment it incurs costs related to liability exposure
in addition to the provision of compliant treatment. Therefore, the total expected costs
incurred if the MCO induces compliant treatment are higher in a regime in which contracts
are not observable. For this reason the MCO induces compliant treatment less often when
patients are unable to observe the contract terms.
Given the analysis of behavior in observable and unobservable contract regimes, it is
possible to characterize how adjusting damages (while holding constant all other variables
not a®ected by behavior) a®ects behavior in each regime. Variations in treatment and
litigation decisions resulting from changes in expected damages are examined both in
observable contract regimes and in unobservable contract regimes. The observability of
the contract signi¯cantly a®ects how treatment and litigation decisions react to changes
in expected damages. In addition, when contracts are observable, patterns of behavior
strongly depend on the cost of compliant treatment. These results display the danger in
assuming that decreasing damages will lead to a decrease in medical malpractice claims.
In addition, it might not be the case that increasing damages will lead to a subsequent in-
crease in compliant treatment levels. The model's results suggest that changes in damages
a®ect behavior in much more complex ways.
The results also suggest an e±cient damage rule.6 When compliant treatment is
6The e±cient damage rule is constructed under the assumptions of the model. The model assumes
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bene¯t), the court should set damages high so that the physician will (almost) always
compliantly treat and the patient will (almost) never sue. The results show that, in this
case, the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract to compensate the physician. On the
other hand, when compliant treatment is socially ine±cient (i.e., the cost of compliant
treatment is high relative to its expected bene¯ts), the court should set damages equal
to zero so that the physician will never provide compliant treatment and the patient will
never sue. In this case, the MCO will pay the physician nothing. Interestingly, the court
can obtain this (approximate) ¯rst-best outcome regardless of the observability of the
contract terms. In addition, under the assumptions of the model, outcomes under the
e±cient damage rule do not depend on which parties an injured patient is allowed to sue.
The e±cient damage rule is used as a benchmark to assess the e±ciency of two com-
monly used damage rules: the all-or-nothing rule and the loss-of-a-chance rule. The
analysis shows that both rules are ine±cient because they merely attempt to compensate
the patient for her loss in the event the physician does not meet the standard of care. For
this reason, the rules provide ine±cient incentives for the physician and the MCO to pro-
vide compliant treatment when it is socially optimal. The resulting ine±ciencies depend
on various parameters of the model and are summarized according to these parameters.
Finally, the model provides insight into the e®ects of allowing the patient to sue certain
parties. Treatment choices and litigation decisions do not depend on whether the court
allows the patient to sue the physician only, the MCO only or both. The expected costs
of lawsuits e®ectively are built into the contract between the MCO and the physician.
This result holds for any damage rule. Rules establishing potential defendants, however,
might a®ect the type of contract the MCO prefers.
To summarize, the paper ¯rst presents predictions of the MCO's contract choice,
the physician's treatment decision and the litigation decision by injured patients when
the contract is observable and when it is not. Second, it presents results showing that
more compliant treatment and fewer medical malpractice claims occur when contracts are
observable. Third, it characterizes for all cases the reactions of treatment and litigation
strategies to changes in damages. Fourth, it constructs an e±cient damage rule to analyze
two commonly used damage rules. Finally, it presents an analysis of how behavior is
that the court can perfectly verify the physician's action. Relaxing this assumption signi¯cantly changes
the construction of the e±cient damage rule. This is discussed infra in Section 7.
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The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the contributions made
by this study in relation to several literatures. As a prelude to the details behind the formal
model, Section 3 o®ers a simple numerical example to clarify the basic intuitions of the
model. Section 4 develops the framework applied to study how legal rules a®ect behavior
in health care markets. Section 5 provides a detailed analysis of the model's equilibria
for observable contracts and unobservable contracts and discusses the intuition behind
the results. The section also provides results showing that more compliant treatment and
fewer claims occur when contracts are observable. All formal proofs can be found in the
Appendix. Section 6 characterizes how treatment and litigation decisions vary as damages
change. Section 7 suggests an e±cient damage rule based on the results from Sections
5 and 6. The e±cient damage rule is used as a benchmark to analyze the e±ciency of
two commonly used damage rules. Section 8 discusses the e®ects of rules regarding which
parties the patient is allowed to sue. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Background and Contributions
This paper contributes to several literatures related to general topics in law and economics
and to more speci¯c literatures devoted to the regulation of health care markets. This
section is designed to identify the literatures to which the present study contributes and
to clarify the insights that the analysis provides.
First, law and economics scholars have taken signi¯cant steps toward untangling the
relationship between litigation and deterrence.7 Polinsky and Shavell [60] construct a
general model to study the e®ects of court error on a potential injurer's level of care
decision and a victim's litigation decision when the victim does not observe the injurer's
level of care. The model, however, assumes that the plainti®'s belief that the defendant
is truly \guilty" is exogenous and not essential to the analysis.8 The present study em-
7See Brown [11], Landes and Posner [44] and Shavell [67] for comprehensive analyses of tort law and
deterrence.
8Several other studies do not account fully for the equilibrium e®ects of litigation. For example, see
Simon [68] (assuming that the potential plainti® costlessly collects a signal of the injurer's negligence);
Schweizer [65] (modelling litigation and settlement by assuming that \nature provides the parties with
information on the merits of the case"); Cooter and Rubinfeld [14] (modelling the choice between settle-
ment and litigation by assuming that the subjective expected trial payo® to the plainti® is determined
solely by parties expenditures on the trial); Kaplow [37] (assuming the plainti®'s probability of victory
does not depend on the incentives of the defendant to take care and concluding that increasing damages
will lead to an increase in the plainti®'s willingness to sue).
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deciding whether to take costly precautions, a potential injurer considers the possibility
of litigation and, when deciding whether to sue the injurer, a victim updates her belief of
injurer \guilt" by considering how legal rules a®ect injurer behavior.9 Modelling behavior
in this way captures the subtle interactions between damages, the likelihood of compliant
treatment and the rate of claims. For example, in an attempt to reduce claim rates, many
states have established maximum damage awards in medical malpractice cases (Browne
and Puelz [12]). The present model suggests that the intended goal of reducing the num-
ber of claims might not be achieved by reducing damages. Depending on the relationship
between compliant treatment costs and damages, lowering damages might lower the prob-
ability that the physician compliantly treats, which in turn could increase the probability
that the patient is negligently injured and the probability that an injured patient will ¯le
a claim. Therefore, lowering damages could increase claim rates, contrary to the intended
e®ect. Using an equilibrium model to analyze the complex interactions between damages,
treatment decisions and litigation decisions illuminates the non-obvious potential e®ects
of changes in legal rules.
Health care economics scholars draw on general models of agency relationships and
litigation and deterrence to explore the imperfections of health care markets. Arrow's [3]
seminal paper is the ¯rst of many to address health care market imperfections. A handful
of studies focuses on how physicians respond to various legal regimes. For example, Green
[28] constructs a model to analyze how litigation a®ects physician behavior when patients
are unable to observe physician action. Blomqvist [9] uses a formal model of health care
markets to propose a liability rule designed to mitigate the negative e®ects of information
asymmetries. Danzon's [16] study of physician behavior under various legal regimes10 ap-
pears to be most closely related to the present study. She examines behavior and outcomes
under various MCO contracts (i.e., capitation and fee-for-service reimbursement). These
studies, while providing important insights into physician behavior, do not consider how
MCOs adjust contracts to account for changes in legal rules. Given the modern structure
of the health care industry, a richer understanding of physician behavior can be gained
9Examples of other models of litigation and deterrence that consider equilibrium e®ects in di®erent
settings include Png [58] (modelling litigation, liability and incentives for care to analyze the e®ects of
the settlement process) and Bernardo, Talley and Welch [5] (constructing an equilibrium model to study
the e®ects of legal presumptions on principal-agent relationships).
10Speci¯cally, she considers no liability, negligence and strict liability regimes.
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contracts change as legal rules evolve.11
The purpose of designing the model presented here is to analyze the e®ects of con-
tract disclosure rules on MCO contract choices, physician treatment decisions and patient
litigation decisions. No study of disclosure laws seems to analyze formally the e®ects of
these laws on behavior in health care markets.12 Miller and Sage [51] provide a useful
summary of the state of disclosure laws and discuss the potential problems with imple-
menting the rules. In a recent and quite comprehensive study, Sage [62] summarizes the
debate over whether information disclosure is an e®ective means to regulate health care
markets. Finally, Hall [30] discusses reasons for incentive disclosure including reducing
agency problems with respect to obtaining the patient's informed consent and educating
the public about cost containment methods used by MCOs. While these papers pro-
vide interesting perspectives on disclosure rules, neither studies the complicated e®ects of
these rules on health care actors' behavior. In particular, no study evaluates how these
rules lead MCOs to choose di®erent contracts which in°uence treatment and litigation
decisions. Without a comprehensive analysis of the behavioral e®ects of these rules, the
usefulness of normative prescriptions is limited.
The model also provides a means to evaluate the e±ciency of medical malpractice
damage rules courts implement when an injured patient proves that a physician's negligent
behavior caused her injury. Studies that analyze the e±ciency of medical malpractice
damage rules are sparse. King [39] analyzes the all-or-nothing damage rule and argues
that employing a loss-of-a-chance framework more fairly compensates an injured patient
for losses due to negligent care. King's study, however, does not consider how physician
treatment choices respond to damage rules. In adopting the loss-of-a-chance rule, some
courts expound on the deterrence e®ects of various medical malpractice damage rules.13
11In a recent foreword, Pauly [56] notes that "[w]e still have few de¯nitive formal models of market
equilibrium with physicians and patient having di®erent sets of information...." This study is an attempt
to ¯ll this gap in the literature.
12Several papers addressing disclosure rules provide useful background information. For example, see
Hellinger [33] (providing details on disclosure rule proliferation and a brief discussion of the debate
surrounding these rules); Morreim [53] (focusing on who should be required to disclose contract infor-
mation, what information should be disclosed and how disclosure rules should be implemented); Miller
and Horowitz [50] (addressing the challenge of informing without doing harm to the physician-patient
relationship); Hall, Kidd and Dugan [31] (evaluating whether disclosure accomplishes the goals it sets
out to achieve).
13See Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984) (concluding that the all-or-
nothing rule, which awards no compensation if the chance of recovery with treatment is less than one-
half, "declares open season on critically ill or injured persons."); Shively v. Klein, 551 A.2d 41(Del.
1988) (arguing that the physician should be held responsible for any decrease in the patient's chance of
11
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it provides better deterrence than the all-or-nothing rule. The present study goes one
step further be analyzing how these rules a®ect MCO contract choices which in turn
in°uence physician treatment choices and patient litigation decisions. By stretching the
analysis to include the MCO's contract choice, the ine±ciencies of the damage rules can
be characterized.
Finally, the model facilitates a formal analysis of tortfeasor rules.14 A signi¯cant
literature is devoted to the study of vicarious liability and the in°uence of tortfeasor rules
on outcomes. For example, Kornhauser [41] and Sykes [70] consider the e®ects of vicarious
liability under various market conditions including the presence of wealth-constrained
agents, signi¯cant transaction costs, the employer's ability to condition wages on care
levels, proof problems, con°icts of interest and the employer's ability to communicate
incentives, screen and supervise.15 Although these conditions are not considered in the
present study, the model easily could be extended to take them into account. A handful of
studies focuses on the theory of enterprise liability in health care markets.16 These studies,
however, do not analyze formally how tortfeasor rules combine with disclosure rules to
a®ect contract, treatment and litigation decisions. The present study o®ers predictions
regarding how MCO contract choices react to various tortfeasor rules.
Section 3 provides a numerical example to illustrate some of the results' intuitions.
3 Numerical Examples
This section provides numerical examples of the paper's basic results regarding how con-
tract, treatment and litigation decisions react to disclosure rules. The ¯rst example as-
sumes patients are able to observe the contract between the MCO and the physician. The
second assumes that contracts are unobservable. The purpose of this section is two-fold.
First, the examples help to illuminate the intuitions behind the model's results. Second,
it o®ers a framework to keep in mind while digesting the general results.
recovery).
14Tortfeasor rules specify the parties an injured plainti® may sue.
15Also see Latin [45] (analyzing tortfeasor rules under the assumption that actors are severely restricted
by cognitive constraints); Polinsky and Shavell [59] (suggesting that principal-only liability is not optimal
if the principal is unable to penalize the agent an amount more than the amount of the harm his actions
might cause and that the negligence rule should govern sanctions on agents but not those on principals).
16For example, see Sage [63] and Epstein [20].
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This example assumes that patients are able to observe the contract the MCO uses to
compensate the physician for providing medical services to the MCO's insured members.
Assume the following about player payo®s. The MCO pays the physician a ¯xed payment
(possibly zero), reimburses some amount (possibly zero) of the cost of treatment when the
physician treats a patient and faces exposure to damages if a patient realizes a negative
outcome and sues the MCO. The physician receives a ¯xed payment from the MCO and,
upon treating a patient, pays the cost of treatment and is reimbursed some amount by
the MCO. The physician also faces exposure to damages given a negative outcome and a
lawsuit. Finally, the patient, upon realizing a negative outcome, must decide whether to
sue without knowing the physician's action. In other words, an injured patient is unable
to observe whether she received compliant treatment. If a lawsuit is ¯led, the patient
pays some cost to pursue the medical malpractice claim. The court perfectly veri¯es the
physician's action and awards damages if the physician did not treat.17
Imagine a population of 100 identical patients experiencing the same medical condi-
tion. The condition is such that the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant
treatment is 40%. Compliant treatment provided by the physician will increase the chance
of a positive outcome to 80%. If compliant treatment is provided, the physician will in-
cur a cost of $10,000 per patient ($1,000,000 to treat all 100 patients). No cost will be
incurred for non-compliant treatment.18 If a patient experiences a bad outcome, the cost
of bringing a lawsuit is $5,000.19
Consider the outcome under various damage levels. First, imagine that if a patient
experiences a negative outcome, ¯les a lawsuit and wins in court (or settles), the MCO
and physician collectively must pay the patient $4,000 in damages. At this damage
17The model is su±ciently general such that the court can provide a variety of incentives by specifying
any standard of care it wishes. For example, the court might award damages if the physician does
not implement the treatment that is customary in a particular locality given the patient's condition.
Alternatively, the court might award damages only if the net bene¯t from the physician's action is greater
than the cost. Therefore, imposition of liability \if the physician did not provide compliant treatment"
can be interpreted in many di®erent ways depending on the standard of care the court speci¯es.
18The cost of non-compliant treatment is normalized to zero for ease of computation. Identical results
would obtain if the model assumed a strictly positive cost of non-compliant treatment. The only necessary
assumption is that the cost of compliant treatment must exceed the cost of non-compliant treatment.
19Note that the primitives of the model are the probability that a positive outcome results given
compliant treatment, the probability that a positive outcome results given non-compliant treatment, the
cost incurred by the physician to provide compliant treatment, the cost to an injured patient to ¯le and
pursue a medical malpractice claim, damages payable by a negligent physician and/or MCO, the value of
health for a patient who experiences a positive outcome and the insurance premium paid by an enrollee
to the MCO for health care insurance.
Note that optimal court rules are not considered in Sections 3 through 5. See infra Section 7 for the
development of an optimal court rule under the conditions of the model.
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($4,000). Knowing this, the MCO will pay the physician nothing and the physician will
not compliantly treat.20
Consider the outcome if expected damages increase to $5,500.21 In this case, the
MCO knows that injured patients have some incentive to sue because expected damages
exceed litigation costs. Therefore, it compares the expected cost of compliant treatment
and expected damages given non-compliant treatment to decide whether to employ a
fee-for-service contract (to induce compliant treatment and avoid litigation) or a capi-
tated contract (to avoid costly compliant treatment and accept exposure to damages). If
the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract, its total expected treatment cost is roughly
$230,000 (23% of $1,000,000) because the physician need only compliantly treat 23% of
the 100 patients to deter injured patients from suing.22 Recall that patients face risk if
they sue partly due to the fact that they are unable to observe the physician's action
in each case. Therefore, if the physician compliantly treats a high enough number of
the 100 patients, each injured patient will ¯nd litigation too risky to pursue. Although
the patients are unable to observe the physician's action in each case, they are ensured
that the physician compliantly treated some number of patients because contract terms
are observable and they know that the physician was compensated with a fee-for-service
contract and his optimal strategy was to compliantly treat just enough patients such that
no patient would risk ¯ling a lawsuit.
On the other hand, if the MCO chooses a capitated contract, it expects to pay $330,000
in damages (100 patients x $5,500 expected damages x 60% probability of a negative
outcome given non-compliant treatment).23 Therefore, the MCO will choose a fee-for-
20Note that calculations for all numerical examples are derived from the formal propositions provided
in Section 5.
21To simplify the example, assume that damages must be paid jointly by the MCO and the physician.
Section 8 will reveal that treatment and litigation decisions do not depend on which parties the patient
is allowed to sue. This results from the fact that the physician will reject the contract unless the MCO
absorbs the physician's exposure to liability. Therefore, the MCO considers total expected damages
regardless of whether the patient sues the MCO. The form of the contract, however, does depend on the
group of potential defendants.
22Studies have shown that MCOs sometimes authorize disparate treatment for similarly-situated pa-
tients. For example, Peters and Rogers [57] report a study of authorizations for bone marrow transplants
to treat breast cancer. They found that MCOs approved the treatment in 77% of all cases and denied
identical treatment in 23% of similarly-situated cases, claiming that the treatment was experimental in
nature and not covered under the patients' health care insurance policies.
23It is important to note that the model predicts that whenever the MCO compensates the physician
using a capitated contract (i.e., some strictly positive ¯xed payment and no reimbursement for treatment
costs) the physician will never provide compliant treatment (see Claim 3 in the Appendix). In equilibrium,
when it is optimal for the MCO to employ a capitated contract, the capitated payment covers only the
physician's exposure to liability (see Propositions 1 and 2, infra). Clearly we do not observe this behavior
in health care markets. That is, physicians working under capitated contracts do provide compliant
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100 patients and no injured patient will ¯le a medical malpractice claim. Even though the
cost of compliantly treating an individual patient exceeds expected damages if that one
patient sues, the physician must compliantly treat only a few patients to avoid lawsuits
because the patient's expected gain from a successful lawsuit is low ($5,500{$5,000=$500).
Next, imagine that expected damages increase to $10,000 per case. As before, the
MCO compares the cost of compensating the physician using a fee-for-service contract
with that of a capitated contract. The increase in damages leads to an increase in an
injured patient's expected gain from suing. Knowing this, the physician must increase
the number of patients he compliantly treats to keep the patients from suing. Speci¯cally,
the physician must compliantly treat 75 of the 100 patients to ensure that no injured
patient risks suing. Therefore, if the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract, expected
treatment costs are $750,000. Alternatively, if the MCO chooses a capitated contract,
it faces expected damages of $600,000 (100 patients x $10,000 expected damages x 60%
probability of a negative outcome given non-compliant treatment). Therefore, under
these conditions, the MCO will choose a capitated contract and pay the physician a ¯xed
payment to cover his exposure to liability. The physician will never provide compliant
treatment, and every injured patient will observe that the contract is capitated, deduce
that the physician did not satisfy the legal standard of care and sue. Given that the
physician must compliantly treat a high number of patients to keep injured patients from
suing, the MCO ¯nds it optimal to expose itself to liability rather than paying the expected
cost of treatment.
Finally, imagine that expected damages increase one last time to $50,000 per case.
At this level, an injured patient's expected gain from ¯ling a claim is high. Knowing
this, the physician increases the number of patients he compliantly treats to 97 out of
100. Given this treatment rate, the MCO expects to incur treatment costs of $970,000
if it employs a fee-for-service contract. It compares this cost to its expected cost from
potential damages if it employs a capitated contract, encouraging the physician to avoid
costly compliant treatment. Given the high damage award, this expected cost amounts
to $3,000,000 (100 patients x $50,000 expected damages x 60% probability of a negative
treatment to patients in some strictly positive number of cases. The model's extreme result regarding
behavior under capitation obtains because the risk-sharing features of capitation are ignored. Adding
them to the model, however, would increase its complexity without adding much insight given the focus
of the study.
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treatment rate is high, the MCO ¯nds it optimal to compensate the physician using a
fee-for-service contract to encourage compliant treatment and avoid exposure to costly
litigation. The physician will compliantly treat 97 of 100 patients and injured patients,
observing the fee-for-service contract, will never sue.
This example illustrates the complexities involved in predicting how changes in dam-
ages will a®ect behavior by market actors when contracts are observable by patients.
The next section provides an example of how actors react to changes in damages when
contracts are unobservable by patients.
3.2 The Unobservable Contract Case
This example assumes that patients are unable to observe the contract the MCO uses
to compensate the physician. Assume that we have the same 100 patients with the
same medical condition. The probability of a positive outcome is 40% without compliant
treatment and increases to 80% if the physician provides compliant treatment. In addition,
just as in the observable contract case, assume that if compliant treatment is provided,
the physician will incur a cost of $10,000 per patient and an injured patient must pay
$5,000 to pursue a medical malpractice claim. The case in which litigation costs exceed
expected damages results in the same outcome as the observable contract case: injured
patients will never sue, the MCO pays nothing to the physician and the physician never
compliantly treats.
First consider the e®ect of observability on the patients' strategy. In the observable
contract case, patients are able to sue when suing is optimal because they can observe
the contract and know that the physician is either compliantly treating some positive
number of patients (i.e., fee-for-service contract) or providing no compliant treatment
(i.e., capitated contract). The MCO, knowing that the patient can observe the contract
and deduce the physician's strategy, is forced to choose a fee-for-service contract when
expected compliant treatment costs are less than expected damages. If the MCO employed
a capitated contract instead, the physician would never provide compliant treatment and
all injured patients would sue. The MCO would be exposed to expected damages rather
than the lower expected cost of compliant treatment. In other words, the patients' ability
to observe the contract keeps the MCO from discouraging compliant treatment when
16
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art60expected compliant treatment costs are lower than expected damages.
Consider the e®ect of eliminating the patients' ability to observe the contract. Without
this ability, the only way to force the MCO to encourage compliant treatment when the
cost of compliant treatment is low relative to expected damages is for some number of
the patients to sue with certainty upon experiencing a negative outcome. Without the
threat of lawsuits, the MCO would never induce compliant treatment. Given that a
certain number of injured patients will sue, the MCO has an incentive to induce some
level of compliant treatment so that not every patient who brings a suit will win in court.
Therefore, when contracts are unobservable some amount of litigation will occur regardless
of the relationship between the cost of compliant treatment and damages.
With the patient's optimal strategy in mind, imagine that expected damages are
$5,500 per case. Patients cannot observe the contract, so they are left to formulate their
litigation strategy based on the strategy of the MCO. Given the relationship between
cost of compliant treatment per patient ($10,000) and expected damages per patient
given non-compliant treatment and a lawsuit ($5,500 damage award per injured patient x
60% probability of a negative outcome given non-compliant treatment=$3,300), the MCO
¯nds it futile to encourage compliant treatment because for each patient treated the MCO
pays $10,000 in treatment costs but saves only $3,300 in expected damages. Therefore,
the MCO maximizes its payo® by choosing a capitated contract, which encourages the
physician to avoid costly compliant treatment in all cases.24 The patients can infer the
MCO's strategy given the relationship between expected damages and the cost of com-
pliant treatment. Therefore, knowing that the court will award damages, every patient
sues with certainty. This outcome di®ers substantially from the observable contract case.
Informing the patient about the contract terms allows the MCO to communicate the
physician's level of compliant treatment, which, in turn, reduces the rate of litigation. If
the MCO ¯nds it optimal to conceal contracts for some reason (e.g., to protect their trade
secret status), they sacri¯ce the ability to reveal the physician's strategy to patients.
Finally, imagine that expected damages increase to $50,000 per case. At this damage
level, the cost of compliant treatment per patient ($10,000) is less than expected dam-
ages per case ¯led ($50,000 x 60% probability of a negative outcome given non-compliant
treatment=$30,000). Therefore, the MCO ¯nds it optimal to encourage the physician to
24Note that the MCO must pay the physician a ¯xed payment equal to the physician's expected
damages or the physician will reject the contract.
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pensate the physician. The physician, however, will not provide compliant treatment with
certainty because he knows that each patient is unable to observe his treatment choice.
In fact, to encourage the physician to compliantly treat at all, some number of injured
patients must commit to suing with certainty. In this particular situation, if one-third of
all injured patients sue with certainty, the physician will provide compliant treatment to
some number of patients to reduce the exposure to liability. Speci¯cally, considering the
tradeo® between compliant treatment costs and expected damages given that one-third
of all injured patients will sue, the physician will ¯nd it optimal to compliantly treat 97
of the 100 patients.
Section 4 develops the formal framework used to study the general e®ects of various
legal rules on contract, treatment and litigation decisions.
4 The Framework
This section develops an approach to study the role of speci¯c judicial and legislative rules
in health care markets in a somewhat nonstandard agency model. The model is unusual in
that it involves two simultaneous principal-agent relationships. First, the physician acts
as an agent for the patient.25 In addition, the physician acts as an agent for the MCO.
Although the model assumes that the MCO can contract with the physician based on
the cost of treatment, it is unable to contract directly on the e®ort level of the physician.
The model's stages progress as follows. First, the MCO selects a contract. Second, the
physician, knowing the contract terms, chooses whether to compliantly treat the patient.
Compliant treatment reduces the probability of a bad outcome for the patient. Third,
the patient either enjoys a positive outcome or su®ers a negative outcome. Fourth, upon
realizing a negative outcome the patient decides whether to ¯le a medical malpractice
claim.26 Finally, the court rules on liability and awards damages to compensate the
patient for her losses.27 All players are assumed to be risk neutral and expected-utility
maximizers. The following diagram presents the stages of the game.
25The model assumes that the physician sees one patient. Therefore, his behavior will be framed in
terms of the likelihood that he compliantly treats the one patient rather than treating a certain percentage
of a population of identical patients.
26Sections 5, 6 and 7 assume that the patient ¯les claims against both the MCO and the physician.
Section 8 considers various tortfeasor rules dictating to the patient which parties she may sue.
27The fact that the model does not consider a settlement option does not change the insights it provides.
The model can be extended to account for situations in which the parties might participate in settlement
negotiations. The extension, however, makes the model unnecessarily complicated given its focus.
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and damages
4.1 MCO Contract Choice
In the ¯rst stage of the game, the MCO chooses a contract to obtain physician services
for its insured patient. The contract consists of two terms: (1) a ¯xed payment, f ¸ 0,
which does not depend on the physician's treatment decision, and (2) an amount the
MCO reimburses the physician for the cost of treatment, r ¸ 0. The model considers all
contracts (r;f) in <2
+ (i.e., all possible combinations of reimbursement amounts and ¯xed
payments).
Given the patient's illness, the MCO considers the cost of compliant treatment relative
to expected damages and, anticipating the reactions of the physician and the patient,
chooses a contract, · = (r;f), to maximize its ex ante expected payo®.28 The contract will
either induce compliant treatment or encourage the physician to forego costly compliant
treatment.
It is important to note that the MCO's choice is constrained by the physician's indi-
vidual rationality constraint. This means that the MCO must provide the physician with
enough of an incentive to induce him to accept the contract rather than seek employment
elsewhere. The MCO is also constrained by the equilibrium behavior of the other actors.
4.2 Physician Treatment Decision
Once the MCO chooses a contract, the physician considers the cost of compliant treatment
relative to expected damages, anticipates the patient's strategy given a negative outcome
and decides whether to provide compliant treatment. In e®ect, the physician in the
28The process described here is akin to the current practice of utilization review. For each individual
case (usually with treatment costs above a certain threshold) the MCO will decide if compensating the
physician to perform the procedure that complies with the legal standard of care will result in a higher
expected payo® than denying reimbursement for the cost of such treatment. Therefore, the model's
results can be interpreted alternatively as predicting how legal rules a®ect MCO authorization rates.
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its contract choice.29
The model assumes that the physician's treatment decision is private. Although the
patient can observe the outcome, the patient is unable to observe or monitor the physi-
cian's action due to the asymmetric nature of the information necessary to make sound
medical decisions. While physicians are trained extensively in identifying symptoms, di-
agnosing illnesses and treating ailments, most patients have little, if any, knowledge of
the intricacies of this highly technical ¯eld. Although patients might be able to obtain
multiple physician opinions, they could be of limited use in alleviating asymmetries of
information. Patients might not possess adequate information to identify the most e±ca-
cious from among the multiple opinions. Furthermore, if the patient is limited to receiving
medical services from physicians contracting with his MCO, all available physicians likely
are under the in°uence of the same ¯nancial incentives. Therefore, the patient might
receive similar opinions from all physicians asked to diagnose the ailment and suggest a
treatment. Finally, seeking multiple opinions simply might be too costly.30
Even though the patient cannot observe the physician's action, she does observe the
outcome. This information alone, however, does not enable the patient to identify the
action. Even if the physician does not provide compliant treatment, the patient might
experience a positive outcome. Likewise, in some cases in which the physician compliantly
treats, a bad outcome results. For example, imagine that the patient experiences back
pain and seeks medical care. After collecting information about the patient's symptoms,
the physician must decide on a treatment option. Assume that the physician considers two
options: prescribing a low cost medication and prescribing a more expensive diagnostic
test which could lead to a costly surgical procedure. Even though the physician knows
that the low cost option does not meet the standard of care, he might prescribe it to
reduce his costs. In fact, he might be forced to prescribe the low cost treatment because
he is unable to pay the out-of-pocket cost for the more expensive treatment if the MCO
does not reimburse for treatment costs. The model assumes that the patient is unable
to judge the quality of care provided by the physician and, upon realizing a negative
29Evidence exists to suggest that physicians advocate on behalf of their patients to urge MCOs to
approve costly treatment. Countervailing evidence, however, indicates that physicians generally are tied
to following the dictates of the MCO. See, e.g., Miller [49] (discussing legal rules that promote the role of
physician as patient advocate and the hurdles physicians face as potential advocates); Sage [61] (discussing
physician advocacy obligations and professional and structural barriers to medical advocacy).
30See Green [28] for additional justi¯cations of this assumption.
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the physician met the standard of care without pursuing costly veri¯cation.
The MCO faces similar hurdles in observing and monitoring the physician's action. To
observe the physician's action, the MCO must evaluate every step in the physician's deci-
sion making process including symptom analysis, choice of diagnostic tests, interpretation
of diagnostic tests, etc. The model assumes the MCO is unable to perform monitoring of
this type in a cost e®ective manner. Therefore, the MCO is unable to contract based on
the physician's action. The model assumes, however, that the MCO is able to contract
based on cost.
Providing treatment imposes on the physician a strictly positive cost, c. If the physi-
cian does not treat, he incurs no direct cost (i.e., c = 0).31 Providing treatment, however,
can bene¯t the physician as it a®ects the probability that the patient will realize a positive
outcome and the likelihood that the physician will be liable for injuries su®ered by the
patient. Speci¯cally, the relationship between the physician's action and the probability
of a positive outcome is summarized in the following table:
Positive outcome Negative outcome
Compliant Treatment p (1 ¡ p)
Non-compliant Treatment q (1 ¡ q)
The parameter p 2 [0;1] measures the extent to which compliant treatment a®ects the
patient's outcome. As p increases the importance of the physician's action with respect
to the outcome increases. The parameter q 2 [0;1] represents the probability that the
patient enjoys a positive outcome after non-compliant treatment. The model assumes
that p > q. In other words, the patient has a better chance for a positive outcome given
compliant treatment than with non-compliant treatment.32 Once the physician decides
31Note that, even though the cost incurred by the physician is monetary in nature, this does not imply
that the physician's action is observable by the MCO or the patient. The model considers the most
severe case (c = 0 in the case the physician does not treat). One, however, might imagine a case in
which the physician incurs a large cost when providing treatment that meets the established standard
of care and a lower cost for providing a non-compliant treatment. Given the cost of treatment, the
patient cannot identify whether the physician chose the appropriate treatment for the reasons previously
discussed. Indeed, the physician has discretion during the diagnostic phase to lean toward diagnoses
that require low cost treatments. The model could include an additional parameter for the lower cost of
inappropriate treatment, but this would complicate the model without adding any insight.
32The relationship between the physician's action and the probability of a positive outcome clearly
is much more complex than the model assumes. This assumption, however, simply gets at the notion
that other factors in addition to the physician's action contribute to the patient's outcome. In addi-
tion, assuming that compliant treatment results in a higher probability of a positive outcome than that
resulting from non-compliant treatment seems reasonable given that compliant treatments obtain that
status because they result in positive outcomes more often than non-compliant treatments (although this
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between the physician's action and the patient's outcome.
When deciding whether to treat, the physician will consider the contract terms, the
cost of treatment and expected damages if compliant treatment is not provided. Stud-
ies have shown that contractual arrangements such as capitation motivate physicians to
behave di®erently than similarly-situated physicians not facing such ¯nancial incentives.
Although some argue that medical ethics protect patients from the undesirable e®ects
of contractual incentives, substantial evidence that contract terms between MCOs and
physicians signi¯cantly a®ect physician behavior proves otherwise. For example, Stearns
et al. [69] studied the changes in treatment rates when a speci¯c group of physicians was
shifted from fee-for-service to capitation. The study found large changes in utilization in
response to the shift. In a second study, Green¯eld et al. [29] compared patient hospi-
talization rates for physicians paid under a fee-for-service arrangement and physicians of
the same group paid by the same employer under capitation. The study controlled exten-
sively for patient characteristics. They concluded that hospitalization was signi¯cantly
more likely for fee-for-service patients. These studies suggest that physician behavior is
motivated by factors other than medical ethics. In some situations physicians simply
might ¯nd it infeasible to provide proper treatment given the compensation arrangement
with the patient's MCO.33 Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the claim that
physicians consider expected damages when making treatment decisions.34 Finally, the
model assumes that the physician gains no direct utility from the patient's outcome.35
assumption is questionable in a regime characterized by managed care in which standards eventually
might be set by MCOs as they encourage physicians to perform low cost treatments in some cases).
33The e®ect of outcomes on the physician's reputation might factor into his utility function. The model,
however, assumes that the physician's utility function does not account for reputation e®ects. The model
can be altered to include this feature. The intuitions provided by the model, however, would not change.
In addition, the model does not consider the e®ect of medical malpractice insurance on the physician's
treatment decision. Almost all physicians carry medical malpractice insurance so that, in the event the
physician is held liable for damages, the insurance carrier will cover some or all of the damages owed
to the injured patient. Naturally, insurance coverage will a®ect the physician's treatment decision. The
e®ect, however, is limited. For example, most insurers specify a maximum amount they will pay per
incident. For comprehensive studies of how medical malpractice insurance a®ects health care markets
and physician behavior see Bhat [6], Danzon [17] and Schlesinger [64].
34See White [72] (concluding that the medical malpractice system clearly communicates to physicians
the risks of providing substandard care); Lawthers et al. [46] (¯nding that physicians respond to the risk
of lawsuits by taking actions to reduce the probability of patient injury); Blendon et al. [7] (reporting that
over sixty percent of physicians involved in the authors' study sometimes practiced defensive medicine).
But see, Liang [47] (using survey data to show that physicians do not know the judicial standard of care
for medical malpractice and are not aware of the level of damages assessed against liable physicians).
35This assumption leads to predictions for the most extreme case. Other models assume that physicians
are imperfect agents, but derive some utility from patient outcomes. For example, see Blumstein [10],
Havighurst [32], Danzon [16], Pauly [55], Farley [22], Ellis and McGuire [19] and Arlen and MacLeod [1].
Weakening the assumption that physicians are self-interested does not a®ect the general intuitions the
present model o®ers in terms of how legal rules a®ect behavior.
22
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art604.3 Patient's Litigation Decision
If the patient realizes a positive outcome after the physician administers treatment, she
receives a payo® of H,36 her value of health, and the game ends. On the other hand,
if the patient realizes a negative outcome, she must decide whether to ¯le a claim for
medical malpractice. Although the patient knows the outcome, she is unable to observe
the physician's action. Based on the outcome the patient must form beliefs represented by
a probability that the physician compliantly treated.37 In addition, the patient considers
expected damages and the expected cost of litigation, L, when deciding whether to sue.38
4.4 Damages and Disclosure Laws
If the patient experiences a negative outcome and decides to ¯le a claim, the court hears
the case and decides on the issue of liability. The model assumes that the court uses
a negligence standard with customary treatment as the standard of care.39 In addition,
the model assumes that the court can verify perfectly whether the physician provided
compliant treatment.40 If the patient wins in court against the MCO, the MCO must pay
36The complications associated with measuring the value of a positive outcome to the patient are
outside the scope of this paper. The model assumes that the value of health, H, is measurable. For
interesting views on measuring the value of health, see Bloche [8], Korobkin [42] and Dolan [18]. Bhat
[6] discusses how courts calculate damages to compensate an injured patient for the value of lost health.
37Note that the results presented here do not depend on whether MCOs actually comply with the legal
rules mandating disclosure. The results depend only on whether patients are able to obtain information
regarding contracts during the medical malpractice litigation stage. Presumably, if a particular state
mandates disclosure of contract terms prior to the litigation stage, patients will be able to obtain this
information during the litigation stage. Similarly, the results do not depend on whether evidence of
economic motivation is admissible during medical malpractice trials. Regardless of whether the patient
is able to present such evidence, the contract terms provide the patient with some information about
how likely it is that the physician provided compliant treatment and whether the patient should expend
resources to verify whether the physician provided compliant treatment.
38The parameter, L, can be thought to capture all expected costs to be incurred by the patient to bring
a lawsuit against any number of defendants. In addition, the model does not include decisions made by
attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis. Danzon [16] claims that medical malpractice attorneys
accept cases on a contingency fee basis, typically charging one-third of the total award won. Adding the
attorney's decision to the model, however, would complicate it without adding additional insight. See
Farber et al. [21] for an interesting analysis of the medical malpractice litigation process.
39To succeed in a medical malpractice lawsuit, the plainti® must prove four elements: (1) the defen-
dant's duty to the plainti® to protect the plainti® from injury; (2) the defendant's failure to exercise or
perform that duty properly; (3) a legally su±cient causal relationship between the defendant's failure and
the plainti®'s injury; and (4) recoverable damages. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d
467, 470 (Okla. 1987). The element of causation is not addressed in this analysis. The model implicitly
assumes that if the physician did not meet the standard of care, his action caused the patient's injury.
The physician fails to perform his duty properly if his e®ort level falls below the standard of care. The
majority rule for the standard of care used by courts to determine liability is a locality rule. Speci¯cally,
if a physician-defendant's behavior conformed to established medical custom practiced by minimally
competent physicians in a given area (local or national), the court will not hold the physician liable for
damages su®ered by the patient. See Furrow [25] for a detailed discussion of the standard of care for
medical malpractice. Also, Keeton et al. [38] provides a general discussion of the theory of negligence as
it relates to medical malpractice suits. The damage rule can be formulated to adjust for the portion of
the injury unrelated to the physician's action. This is discussed infra in Section 7.
40This assumption is not critical for the results provided in Sections 5 and 6. If the model assumed
imperfect veri¯cation, then sometimes physicians and MCOs would face liability after meeting the stan-
dard of care or escape liability when in fact it should be imposed. From an ex ante perspective, assuming
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the physician, the physician must pay expected money damages, Dp, to the patient. Recall
that the patient incurs an expected cost, L, to ¯le and pursue a medical malpractice
lawsuit. If litigation costs (L) exceed the total damage award (Dm+Dp) then the patient
will never sue. Knowing that the patient will not sue, the physician does not provide
compliant treatment and the MCO pays nothing for physician services. When the total
damage award exceeds litigation costs, predicting behavior becomes more complicated.
This case is the main focus of the paper and is presented in Section 5.
Note that the analysis in Section 5 is performed assuming court-determined damages
are held constant. Section 6 considers how damage levels a®ect treatment and litiga-
tion decisions. Section 7 evaluates the ine±ciencies of commonly-used damage rules as
compared to e±cient negligence and damage rules.
As mentioned, the model considers two cases. The ¯rst case assumes that the patient
can observe the contract terms before deciding whether to sue. The second case assumes
that the contract is unobservable. These cases correspond to state legislative rules man-
dating MCOs to disclose to insured patients the terms of their contracts with physicians.
Some states require disclosure, while others do not.41 Therefore, the analysis is performed
under both conditions to gain insight into the e®ects of disclosure laws on behavior in
health care markets.
4.5 The Payo®s
Recall that the MCO moves in the ¯rst stage, choosing a contract for the provision of
medical services to the patient. In the second stage, the physician decides whether to
provide compliant treatment. Next, Nature determines whether the patient experiences
a positive or negative outcome. If a positive outcome is realized, the game ends. If the
perfect veri¯cation merely results in a variance of expected damages di®erent than the variance under the
assumption of imperfect veri¯cation. This has little e®ect on the comparative statics regarding contract,
treatment and litigation decisions. The assumption, however, will a®ect the structure of the e±cient
damage rule. This is discussed further infra in Section 7.
41Note that states vary with respect to the speci¯c information that must be disclosed and the method
that MCOs must use to disclose the information (Hellinger [33]). The model assumes that the patient
is able to observe the contract terms of her particular physician. This assumption, however, might not
hold true for all states requiring disclosure. For example, some states merely require the MCO to provide
general information about incentive arrangements, but do not force MCOs to disclose the actual contract
terms of the patient's physician (Zeiler [73]). Knowing some information about the types of contracts
employed generally, however, aids an injured patient in forming beliefs about whether the physician met
the standard of care.
Courts also have had a hand in formulating disclosure laws. Courts in some jurisdictions have ruled
that failure to disclose contract terms is a breach of ¯duciary duty imposed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. xx1001{1461 (1994)), the federal statute regulating employee
bene¯ts (e.g., see Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997)).
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physician receives a payo® of f + r ¡ c and the patient receives a payo® of H ¡ I, where
I represents an insurance premium paid by the patient to the MCO to obtain medical
insurance prior to stage one of the game.42 If the physician did not provide compliant
treatment, then the payo®s to the MCO, physician and patient are I ¡ f, f and H ¡ I,
respectively.
If a negative outcome occurs, the patient chooses whether to ¯le a claim against the
physician and/or the MCO. If the patient decides not to sue, the game ends. The payo®s
are the same as above with H = 0. If the patient decides to sue, the court decides on
the issue of liability and sets the damage award. Recall that the patient incurs a strictly
positive cost, L, to pursue litigation.
If the physician compliantly treated, the patient loses in court against both the physi-
cian and the MCO. Payo®s to the MCO, physician and patient are I¡f ¡r, f +r¡c and
¡L ¡ I, respectively. Conversely, if the physician did not compliantly treat, the patient
wins against both the physician and the MCO, given that each is named as a defendant.
Damage awards of Dp and Dm are paid to the patient by the physician and MCO, respec-
tively. The patient will sue only if the expected damage award covers the cost of ¯ling
and pursuing litigation. If the court ¯nds that the physician did not compliantly treat,
payo®s are I ¡f ¡Dm, f ¡Dp, and Dm+Dp¡L¡I for the MCO, physician and patient,
respectively.
Section 5 provides results for the case in which contracts are observable and the case
in which they are not. The e®ects of observability on contract, treatment and litigation
decisions are analyzed.
42Although, in this model, I is merely a transfer between the patient and the MCO and does not
a®ect e±ciency, the transfer is important to note when considering the e±ciencies related to health care
insurance, a topic not considered here. The model assumes that the expected bene¯ts of purchasing
health insurance always outweigh the costs. The paper does not address the ine±ciencies created when
the tort system sets damages such that the patient's cost of purchasing health insurance exceeds expected
bene¯ts. Ine±ciencies of this sort are discussed in length in Sykes [70].
The results provided here, however, indirectly show that changes in expected damages will alter the
patient's expected utility in the form of a change in premiums necessary to satisfy the MCO's individual
rationality constraint. A model including e±ciency gained from providing health care insurance to risk
averse patients would reveal a trade-o® between the level of care provided and the reduction of risk
through health care insurance. Speci¯cally, if the standard of care requires more costly treatment, health
care insurance costs increase, pricing some patients out of health care insurance markets.
25
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press5 Analysis of Equilibrium Behavior
Given the framework of the game, it is possible to search for an equilibrium arising from
non-cooperative play when contracts are observable and when they are not. The analysis
uses the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept.43 Denote the probability that the patient
sues given a negative outcome by ° and the probability that the physician compliantly
treats by ¯.
The propositions stated in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 assume that damages exceed litigation
costs. The analysis of the case in which litigation costs exceed damages is straightforward.
In that case, patients have no incentive to sue. Knowing this, the MCO will pay nothing to
the physician in the form of reimbursement for costs or a ¯xed payment and the physician
will not provide compliant treatment. In addition, all results and discussions assume that,
given a negative outcome, patients are able to sue both the physician and the MCO for
medical malpractice. Variations of the results under di®erent tortfeasor rules are given in
Section 8. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
5.1 Equilibrium when Contracts Are Observable by the Patient
This section presents the equilibrium behavior of the MCO, physician and patient assum-
ing the patient is able to observe the contract terms.
Proposition 1 Fix treatment costs, probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment, probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment, expected lit-
igation costs and expected damages. Let m¤ equal the minimum probability of compliant
treatment that guarantees that the patient will never sue. Assume that total expected dam-
ages exceed expected litigation costs (i.e., Dm + Dp > L). The following speci¯es the
equilibrium contracts and resulting equilibrium behavior of the patient and the physician:
(1) If the ex ante expected cost of compliant treatment is low relative to expected dam-
ages given non-compliant treatment (i.e., m¤c < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp);44 then the MCO
43For those not familiar with game theory, this equilibrium concept is used to analyze dynamic games
of incomplete information. It requires that (1) no player has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
strategy given his beliefs and the other players' subsequent strategies, and (2) players update their beliefs
by considering equilibrium strategies and using a speci¯c method called Bayes' rule. See Fundenberg and
Tirole [24] for a formal de¯nition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a broad class of dynamic games of
incomplete information. Gibbons [26] provides an intuitive de¯nition of the equilibrium concept along
with straightforward examples.
44Note that m¤ represents the equilibrium probability of compliant treatment. Therefore, although this
condition is quite intuitive, it is not stated in terms of the model's exogenous variables. The discussion
following the proposition analyzes the MCO's decision in terms of the model's exogenous variables.
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The physician compliantly treats with a probability (m¤) high enough such that the patient
never sues, and the patient never sues.
(2) If the ex ante expected cost of compliant treatment is high relative to expected
damages given non-compliant treatment (i.e., m¤c > (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp)), then the MCO
chooses a capitated contract with a ¯xed payment equal to the physician's expected damages.
The physician never provides compliant treatment, and the patient sues with certainty.
The following discussion provides some intuition behind the results stated in Proposi-
tion 1.
First, note that the MCO takes into account both its expected damages from a suit
against itself and the physician's expected damages from a suit against the physician.
This results from the fact that the MCO must design a contract that the physician will
accept rather than seeking employment elsewhere. If the MCO ¯nds it in its best interest
to induce the physician to avoid costly compliant treatment, then the physician will be
exposed to liability. If the contract does not compensate the physician for his exposure
to liability, he will reject it. Therefore, in the end, the MCO ultimately will bear the
expected damages it faces directly and those faced by the physician.
Also, it is important to note that the physician never provides compliant treatment
with certainty in equilibrium (i.e., m¤ < 1).45 The only way to achieve certain compliant
treatment is for the MCO to reimburse the physician more than the cost of compliant
treatment. The MCO, however, would never do this in equilibrium because it can set the
reimbursement level equal to cost and ensure that the physician compliantly treats with a
high enough probability such that the patient will never sue. Furthermore, the physician
does not have an incentive of his own to compliantly treat with certainty because he
knows that the patient must pay litigation costs to ¯le a suit and that the patient is
uncertain about the physician's action. Suing is risky for the patient because if the court
veri¯es that the physician met the standard of care, the patient's investment in the costly
veri¯cation process becomes fruitless. It follows that the less the patient stands to gain
from winning a lawsuit (i.e., damages less litigation costs), the less e®ort the physician
must exert to ensure that the patient will not sue.
45This result is consistent with results obtained by others. For example, see Ordover [54] and Hylton
[34].
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cian to compliantly treat with some positive probability. This follows directly from the
assumption that the patient is able to observe the contract. If the patient observes a
fee-for-service contract, she can be sure that it was optimal for the MCO to encourage
the physician to compliantly treat and that he will provide compliant treatment with a
probability high enough such that the patient will never sue. If she observes a capitated
contract, she sues for certain, knowing that the physician did not meet the standard of
care.
Next, consider the MCO's contract choice. Its decision hinges on the level of ex
ante expected compliant treatment costs (m¤c) relative to expected damages given non-
compliant treatment ((1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp)). Substituting m¤ =
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)+(1¡p)L into
the condition, m¤c < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp), reveals that the MCO should employ a fee-for-




. Figure 1 provides an example of a
typical outcome when contracts are observable, the probability of a positive outcome given
compliant treatment is 60%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant






















: This graph illustrates MCO contract choices given observable contracts. The
example assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment
is 60%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and
litigation costs are $100. The graph presents the model's prediction of the MCO's contract
choice for all (total expected damages, treatment costs) pairs in the displayed range.
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patient will never sue. Therefore, the MCO will choose a capitated contract with no ¯xed
payment (i.e., the MCO will pay nothing to the physician) and the physician will never
compliantly treat. If damages exceed litigation costs, then the MCO must compare the
ex ante expected compliant treatment cost to total expected damages in order to choose
the optimal contract. The following discussion provides the intuition for outcomes when
damages exceed litigation costs.
If compliant treatment costs are su±ciently low (i.e., c < ^ c),46 the MCO maximizes
its payo® by choosing a fee-for-service contract to induce compliant treatment and avoid
exposure to liability. The MCO will reimburse the physician at least the full cost of treat-
ment so that the physician will compliantly treat with an adequately high probability so
that the patient never sues. This stems from the fact that the patient can observe the
contract terms and, from the terms, infer the physician's strategy. The MCO, however,
enjoys a higher payo® the lower the reimbursement amount; therefore, the MCO will set
reimbursement equal to the cost of treatment. Any amount over cost that the MCO re-
imburses reduces its payo® because the physician will treat with a higher probability even
though the patient will never sue. In equilibrium the MCO will employ a standard fee-for-
service contract (i.e., reimbursement of full cost with no ¯xed payment) and the physician
will compliantly treat with a probability high enough so that the patient never sues. As
compliant treatment costs increase beyond ^ c, the MCO will compare expected compli-
ant treatment costs (m¤c) with expected total damages given non-compliant treatment
((1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp)) when choosing a contract.
When compliant treatment costs exceed ^ c and the patient's expected gain from winning
a lawsuit (i.e., damages less litigation costs) is low (i.e., points in the region of the graph
near \1"), the physician is able to shield himself from damages by providing a low level
of compliant treatment. For this reason, ex ante expected compliant treatment costs are
less than expected total damages and so the MCO will choose a fee-for-service contract,
the physician will provide compliant treatment with a probability high enough such that
the patient will not sue, and the patient will never sue.
46^ c represents the value of c corresponding to the level of total expected damages that minimizes the
function used to ¯nd the MCO's cuto® point (i.e., m¤c = (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp)).
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pair into the region labelled \2"), the MCO will ¯nd it optimal to face exposure to
liability rather than encourage the physician to compliantly treat and so will choose a
capitated contract. Even though damages increase, expected treatment costs also rise
as the physician ¯nds it necessary to increase the probability of compliant treatment
given that patients have more to gain from suing. In other words, the physician is forced
to compliantly treat with a higher probability to ensure that the patient never sues.
This increase in probability of treatment will drive expected treatment costs higher than
expected damages given no treatment. Therefore, the MCO will choose a contract such
that the physician will not provide costly treatment despite the fact that the patient will
sue with certainty. The MCO simply sets the reimbursement policy low enough so that
the physician has no incentive to meet the standard of care. In particular, the MCO
is indi®erent between any contract specifying a relatively low reimbursement level (i.e.,
r · c¡(1¡q)Dp), which ensures that the physician will not provide compliant treatment.
While any of these reimbursement policies will satisfy the equilibrium conditions, it is
natural to assume that the MCO will employ a standard capitated contract with no
reimbursement for cost and a positive ¯xed payment equal to the physician's expected
damages.
If damages continue to increase relative to compliant treatment costs, then eventu-
ally expected damages will once again exceed the expected cost of compliant treatment
(indicated in the graph by region \3") despite the fact that the physician must provide
compliant treatment with a higher probability to keep the patient from suing. The MCO
will revert back to choosing a fee-for-service contract to encourage the physician to pro-
vide compliant treatment with a probability high enough so that the patient never sues,
and the patient never sues.
This result clearly illustrates why policymakers must take care when they contemplate
changes to damage rules, such as setting maximum damage awards.47 Not only will
litigation decisions adjust, but also MCOs and physicians will adjust their behavior to
take into account changes in expected damages. For these reasons, expected changes in
litigation rates might not obtain.
47The medical malpractice insurance crisis led most states to set caps on damages allowable in medical
malpractice lawsuits (Kinney [40]). The theory presented in this study provides one possible explanation
as to why some states did not experience an expected decrease in claim rates. See Kinney [40] for a
critique of malpractice reforms attempted in the 1970s and 80s.
30
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art60The following section presents results for the case in which the patient cannot observe
the contract terms.
5.2 Equilibrium when Contracts Are not Observable by the Pa-
tient
This section presents the equilibrium behavior of the MCO, physician and patient as-
suming the patient is not able to observe the contract terms. Proposition 2 reveals that
observability of the contract terms matters. The critical di®erence in the structure of the
game with observable contracts and this case is that, here, the patient's decision to sue
is made without knowledge of how the MCO compensated the physician. Therefore, the
patient must resort to equilibrium reasoning to infer the physician's action. On the other
hand, when the patient can observe the contract, the patient's decision to sue hinges on
observation of the contract terms and the ability to infer directly the physician's strategy.
Knowing this, the MCO is unable to deviate and change contracts because the patient
would observe the deviation and change her behavior in response. Proposition 2 states
the equilibrium of hthe model when the patient cannot observe the contract terms.
Proposition 2 Fix treatment costs, probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment, probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment, expected liti-
gation costs and expected damages as given. Assume that total expected damages exceed
expected litigation costs (i.e., Dm + Dp > L). The following speci¯es the equilibrium
contracts and resulting equilibrium behavior of the patient and the physician:
(1) If the cost of compliant treatment is low relative to expected damages given non-
compliant treatment (i.e., c < (1¡q)(Dm +Dp)), then the MCO chooses a fee-for-service
contract with partial reimbursement for cost and a positive ¯xed payment. The physician
compliantly treats with a probability high enough such that the patient will not always sue,
and the patient sues with some positive probability.
(2) If the cost of compliant treatment is high relative to expected damages given non-
compliant treatment (i.e., c > (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp)), then the MCO chooses a capitated
contract with a ¯xed payment equal to the physician's expected damages. The physician
does not provide compliant treatment, and the patient sues with certainty.
The formal proof appears in the Appendix. Also, the e®ects of the tortfeasor rule
on contract terms are speci¯ed in Section 8. The following discussion assumes that the
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Notice that the results here substantially di®er from the results given in the case of
observable contracts. First consider the MCO's contract choice. Figure 2 provides an
example of a typical outcome when contracts are unobservable given the same parameter
values used in Figure 1 (i.e., the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treat-
ment is 60%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%












Figure 2: This graph illustrates outcomes given unobservable contracts. The example
assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 60%, the
probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and litigation
costs are $100. The graph presents the model's prediction of the MCO's contract choice
for all (total expected damages, compliant treatment costs) pairs in the displayed range.
As in the observable contract case, when litigation costs exceed damages, the patient
has no incentive to sue no matter how trivial the cost of compliant treatment. Knowing
this, regardless of the cost of compliant treatment the MCO employs a capitated contract
and the physician never provides compliant treatment. When damages exceed litigation
costs the MCO will choose a fee-for-service contract if expected total damages given non-
compliant treatment ((1¡q)(Dm +Dp)) exceed the cost of compliant treatment (c). The
physician will compliantly treat with a high enough probability such that the patient does
not sue with certainty and the patient will sue with a high enough probability such that,
when the cost of compliant treatment is low compared to expected damages given non-
compliant treatment, the MCO will induce compliant treatment. Alternatively, if the cost
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then the MCO choose a capitated contract, the physician never compliantly treats and
the patient sues with certainty.
Note that no equilibrium exists such that the patient never sues. This result directly
relates to the unobservability of the contract terms. As stated previously, when the pa-
tient is unable to observe the contract terms, she must threaten to sue with some positive
probability to provide an incentive for the MCO to encourage compliant treatment with
some positive probability when the cost of such treatment is less than expected damages
given no treatment. The equilibrium probability of suing lies somewhere between suing
with certainty and never suing. If the patient always sued, the physician would always
compliantly treat, which implies that the patient would never choose to sue, a contradic-
tion. Conversely, if the patient never sued, the physician would never compliantly treat,
which implies that the patient would always choose to sue, a contradiction. Therefore, the
equilibrium probability of suing must lie somewhere between these two extremes. When
contracts are observable, on the other hand, the patient need not threaten to sue because
she is able to infer perfectly the physician's behavior from the contract terms. Knowing
this, the MCO is unable to deviate by switching to a contract inducing less compliant
treatment.
Second, note that when deciding on a contract, the MCO compares expected damages
given non-compliant treatment to the full cost of compliant treatment (c) rather than
the expected cost of compliant treatment (m¤c). The fact that the patient is unable to
observe the contract produces this result. As discussed previously, when the patient is
unable to observe the contract, she must sue with some positive probability to encourage
the MCO to induce compliant treatment. In an observable contract regime, the cost
of compliant treatment is merely the expected cost of compliant treatment given the
physician's equilibrium probability of compliantly treating (m¤c). In an unobservable
contract regime, however, if the MCO induces compliant treatment it incurs costs for
actual treatment given the physician compliantly treats (m¤c) plus expected damages from
litigation given the physician does not compliantly treat ((1 ¡ m¤)°¤(1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp)).
The patient's equilibrium probability of suing (°¤) ensures that these costs equate exactly
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are unobservable, the patient is able to ensure the highest level of compliant treatment
possible when the cost of compliant treatment is relatively low.
Third, given that the MCO wishes to induce complaint treatment and reimburses
some portion of the treatment cost, the likelihood that the physician will treat is the
same under both disclosure rules.49 The equilibrium probability of compliant treatment
adjusts for the assumptions that litigation is costly and that the patient is unable to
observe the physician's action. These assumptions remain unchanged regardless of the
observability of the contract. If the MCO induces compliant treatment, the physician will
always compliantly treat just often enough so that the patient does not sue with certainty.
Finally, notice that when compliant treatment costs are relatively low, the MCO em-
ploys a fee-for-service contract with partial reimbursement and some positive ¯xed pay-
ment, whereas, when contracts are observable, the MCO fully reimburses for the full cost
of treatment and provides no ¯xed payment. This is expected given the role of the contract
and the patient's behavior under both disclosure regimes. Consider the MCO's reasons
for employing a reimbursement policy versus a ¯xed payment. The MCO reimburses a
portion of the treatment cost to encourage the physician to compliantly treat with some
positive probability. On the other hand, the MCO will provide a ¯xed payment only
when the physician is exposed to liability. If the MCO does not compensate the physician
for his exposure to liability, the physician has no incentive to accept the contract. Next,
consider the patient's behavior under both regimes. When patients are able to observe the
contract and compliant treatment costs are relatively low, no lawsuits occur. This implies
that the MCO need not provide any ¯xed payment to satisfy the physician's individual
rationality constraint because the physician is never exposed to potential liability. On the
other hand, when patients are unable to observe the contract, litigation occurs with some
positive probability. Therefore, the MCO must pay the physician some ¯xed payment to
compensate for the fact that he always faces potential liability.
With respect to reimbursement for the cost of treatment, the MCO must reimburse
the physician for the full cost of treatment when contracts are observable and compliant
48When the cost of compliant treatment is relatively low, the patient's equilibrium probability of suing
is c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp). Therefore, if the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract its total expected cost is equal
to m¤c + (1 ¡ m¤) c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)(1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) = c.
49Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that, if reimbursed for some portion of the treatment cost, the physician
will compliantly treat with a probability high enough such that the patient will not sue with certainty.
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sue under these conditions. Therefore, the physician has no incentive of his own (i.e.,
exposure to liability) that drives his willingness to satisfy the legal standard of care.
Knowing this, the MCO must fully compensate the physician for the cost of treatment to
encourage the physician to compliantly treat with a probability high enough such that an
injured patient will never sue. When contracts are unobservable, however, the physician
faces potential liability of his own because an injured patient will always sue with some
positive probability. Thus, the MCO can partially reimburse the physician for treatment
costs and still be sure that the physician will compliantly treat with a su±ciently high
probability because he is partially encouraged to provide compliant treatment when he
considers his personal exposure to liability.
By comparing Propositions 1 and 2 one might conclude that, under the assumptions of
the model, MCOs receive a higher payo® in a regime in which contracts are observable.50
Therefore, the model suggests that MCOs are better o® if they voluntarily disclosure
contract terms to insured members. Legislation forcing MCOs to disclose, however, indi-
cates that, in practice, MCOs are reluctant to disclosure voluntarily. Features of health
care markets not taken into account by the model help to explain this phenomenon. For
example, contracts with physicians have a major in°uence on costs incurred by MCOs
to insure its members. Therefore, an MCO might keep contract terms private to remain
competitive in health care insurance markets (Hall [30]). Moreover, by avoiding disclo-
sure, an MCO might limit its liability in cases in which injured plainti®s argue that the
contract terms, themselves, led to substandard care which, in turn, caused injury to the
plainti®.51 Finally, Hall [30] explains why we cannot rely on the market to produce this
information when consumers might ¯nd it of value.
50If c < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp), then the MCO induces compliant treatment regardless of observability.
If contracts are observable, the MCO's payo® is I ¡ mc. If contracts are not observable, the MCO's
payo® is I ¡ c < I ¡ mc. If (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) < c <
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)
m , then if contracts are observable, the
MCO induces compliant treatment and earns a payo® of I ¡mc. If contracts are unobservable, the MCO
does not induce compliant treatment and earns a payo® of I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) < I ¡ mc. Finally, if
c >
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)
m , the MCO does not induce compliant treatment regardless of observability and earns
a payo® of I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp).
51For example, see Bush v. Dake No. 86-2576NM-2, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989) (holding
that whether the MCO's incentive structure had proximately contributed to the injury was a genuine
issue of material fact) and Ching v. Gaines No. CV-137656 (Ventura County Super. Ct. Nov. 15,
1995) (awarding $2.9 million for failure to refer for diagnosis of colon cancer based in part on evidence of
¯nancial incentives to deny care).
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Propositions 1 and 2, taken together, predict the likelihood of lawsuits under di®erent
disclosure laws. The following proposition speci¯es the relationship between disclosure
laws and the likelihood that the patient will ¯le a lawsuit following a negative outcome.
The proof appears in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 For any feasible set of treatment costs (c), probability of a positive out-
come given compliant treatment (p), probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant
treatment (q), expected litigation costs (L) and expected damages (Dm + Dp), the proba-
bility that an injured patient will ¯le a medical malpractice lawsuit in a regime with ob-
servable contracts is less than or equal to the probability under a regime with unobservable
contracts.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When expected litigation costs exceed
expected damages, the comparison is simple. Regardless of the disclosure rule, the patient
will not sue. Therefore, it must be that, when expected damages exceed expected litigation
costs, the probability of suing is lower (in some cases) under a mandatory disclosure rule.




















If not observable, γ*>0.
Figure 3: This graph illustrates the di®erences in claim rates caused by di®erent disclosure
rules. This ¯gure simply combines Figures 1 and 2 using the same parameters (i.e., the
probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 60%, the probability of
a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and litigation costs are $100).
Recall that the patient's equilibrium probability of suing is represented by °¤.
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contract regime to an unobservable contract regime arises from two sources. First, unob-
servability of the contract forces patients to sue to encourage MCOs to induce compliant
treatment when treatment costs are relatively low. Therefore, even if compliant treatment
costs and damage levels are such that the MCO chooses a fee-for-service contract in both
regimes (represented by the lower portion of the graph), more lawsuits occur when the
contract is unobservable.
Second, as discussed previously, the total cost of treatment is higher in an unobservable
regime because the MCO must pay not only the expected cost of treatment but also
expected damages. Therefore, the MCO ¯nds it optimal to induce compliant treatment
less often when patients are unable to observe the contract. The hatched area of Figure 3
represents the set of (expected total damages, compliant treatment costs) pairs for which
the MCO will induce compliant treatment only in an observable regime. For these pairs,
patients will never sue if they are able to observe the contract, but will always sue if they
cannot observe the contract. This results in higher claim rates in unobservable contract
regimes.
The following section performs a similar analysis for the rate of compliant treatment
under each legal regime.
5.4 E®ect of the Disclosure Rule on the Likelihood of Compliant
Treatment
Propositions 1 and 2 also jointly lead to a prediction regarding the likelihood of compliant
treatment under di®erent disclosure laws. The following proposition speci¯es the relation-
ship between disclosure laws and the likelihood that the physician's treatment choice will
satisfy the legal standard of care. The proof appears in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 For any feasible set of compliant treatment costs (c), probability of a
positive outcome given compliant treatment (p), probability of a positive outcome given
non-compliant treatment (q), expected litigation costs (L) and expected damages (Dm +
Dp), the probability that a physician will compliantly treat an injured patient is higher
under a regime in which the patient can observe contract terms between the MCO and
physician relative to a regime in which the patient cannot observe the contract terms.
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garding the e®ect of disclosure rules on the likelihood of litigation. Note ¯rst that, as
explained supra in Section 5.2, the physician's probability of compliantly treating given
reimbursement does not depend on observability of the contract terms. Indeed, the result
here is linked solely to the MCO's contract choice under each disclosure regime. Figure




















Figure 4: This graph illustrates the di®erences in compliant treatment rates caused by
di®erent disclosure rules by combining Figures 1 and 2 using the same parameters (i.e.,
the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 60%, the probability of
a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40% and litigation costs are $100).
Recall that the physician's equilibrium probability of compliantly treating is represented
by ¯¤.
Unlike the comparison of litigation rates, the di®erence in compliant treatment rates
emerges from just one source. That is, for the set of (total expected damages, compliant
treatment costs) pairs for which the MCO will employ a fee-for-service contract regardless
of the observability of the contract (represented by the lower portion of the graph), com-
pliant treatment levels are identical in each legal regime. The physician will compliantly
treat just often enough so that the patient will not sue with certainty. This probability
does not depend on the observability of the contract. Compliant treatment rates, how-
ever, do di®er in the region representing the set of (expected total damages, compliant
treatment costs) pairs for which the MCO will induce compliant treatment only in an
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observable, the costs of compliantly treating the patient are lower than in an unobservable
contract regime. The MCO is more likely, therefore, to employ a capitated contract to
discourage compliant treatment when contracts are unobservable. This leads to the result
that compliant treatment rates are higher in observable contract regimes.
The next section characterizes how physician treatment decisions and patient litigation
decisions vary with changes in damages.
6 E®ect of Damages on the Likelihood of Treatment
and Litigation
Propositions 1 and 2 predict treatment and litigation decisions when total damages exceed
litigation costs. From this analysis we can characterize the relationship between damages
and physician treatment choices and between damages and patient litigation decisions.
Analyses are provided for the case in which contracts are observable and for the case in
which they are not.
6.1 Damages and Litigation
First consider how the patient's litigation decision reacts to a change in total expected
damages. The relationship between damages and litigation depends on observability of
the contract. Recall that the patient will never sue if total expected damages are less than
the patient's litigation costs. The following discussion considers patient behavior when
damages exceed litigation costs.
6.1.1 Observable Contract Regime
When contracts are observable (see Figure 1), the patient's behavior will depend on
whether the cost of compliant treatment is high (i.e., c > ^ c) or low (i.e., c < ^ c). Figure
5 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the patient sues
when compliant treatment costs exceed ^ c. The patient will never sue if the physician
provides compliant treatment with some positive probability. This occurs when total
expected damages are just above litigation costs and when they are su±ciently high
such that expected damages given non-compliant treatment exceed the cost of compliant
treatment. When total expected damages lie somewhere between these two regions, the
MCO chooses a capitated contract, the physician never provides compliant treatment and
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Figure 5: This graph illustrates how the patient's litigation decision varies with changes
in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs exceed ^ c.
The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is
80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation
costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $200.
the patient sues with certainty.
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the
patient sues when compliant treatment costs are less than ^ c. Recall that when compliant
treatment costs are less than ^ c, the MCO ¯nds inducing compliant treatment to be optimal
in all cases. Therefore, the physician always provides compliant treatment often enough
such that the patient never sues, and the patient never sues. Under these conditions, no
litigation occurs.
6.1.2 Unobservable Contract Regime
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the patient
sues when contracts are unobservable. In this case, the MCO will not induce compliant
treatment until expected damages given non-compliant treatment, (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp),
exceed the cost of compliant treatment, c. Once this condition is met, the MCO will
induce compliant treatment and the physician will compliantly treat with some positive
probability. The patient will sue with certainty when the MCO chooses not to induce
compliant treatment. Once the physician begins compliantly treating with an increasing
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Figure 6: This graph illustrates how the patient's litigation decision varies with changes
in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs are less
than ^ c. The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment is 80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is
40%, litigation costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $100.
probability, the patient sues with some probability less than one. As damages increase,
the probability of compliant treatment increases; therefore, the patient ¯nds it optimal
to decrease the probability of ¯ling suit until the probability of ¯ling nears zero.
6.2 Damages and Treatment
Next consider how the physician's treatment decision reacts to a change in total expected
damages. Just as in the case of litigation levels, the relationship between treatment
and damages depends on whether patients are able to observe the contract. Recall that
the physician will never compliantly treat if total expected damages are less than the
patient's litigation costs. The following discussion considers physician behavior when
damages exceed litigation costs.
6.2.1 Observable Contract Regime
When contracts are observable (see Figure 1), the physician's behavior will depend on
whether the cost of compliant treatment is high (i.e., c > ^ c) or low (i.e., c < ^ c). Figure
8 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the physician
compliantly treats when compliant treatment costs exceed ^ c. The physician will never
compliantly treat when litigation costs exceed damages. Once the patient expects a
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Figure 7: This graph illustrates how the patient's ¯ling decision varies with changes in the
damage level when contracts are unobservable. The graph assumes that the probability of
a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 80%, the probability of a positive outcome
given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation costs are $100 and the cost of compliant
treatment is $100.
positive gain from winning a lawsuit, then the MCO induces compliant treatment which
is provided with an increasing probability until damages increase to the point at which
expected compliant treatment costs, m¤c, exceed expected damages given non-compliant
treatment, (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp). At this point, the MCO chooses a capitated contract
and the physician never provides compliant treatment. This continues until damages
increase enough such that the expected damages given non-compliant treatment exceed
the expected cost of compliant treatment. At this point, damages are relatively high and
so the patient will gain signi¯cantly from a successful lawsuit. This results in a high
level of compliant treatment which continues to increase as damages increase until the
probability of compliant treatment is nearly certain.
Figure 9 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the
physician compliantly treats when compliant treatment costs are less than ^ c. Note from
Figure 1 that when compliant treatment costs are less than ^ c, the MCO ¯nds inducing
compliant treatment to be optimal in all cases. Even when the patient's expected gain
from a successful lawsuit is relatively low, the expected cost of compliant treatment is low
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Figure 8: This graph illustrates how the physician's treatment decision varies with changes
in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs exceed ^ c.
The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is
80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation
costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $200.
enough such that compliant treatment at some level is always optimal. This results in a
positive level of compliant treatment once expected damages exceed litigation costs, which
continues to increase as damages increase until the probability of compliant treatment is
nearly certain.
6.2.2 Unobservable Contract Regime
Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between damages and the probability that the physi-
cian compliantly treats when contracts are unobservable (see Figure 2). In this case, the
MCO will not induce compliant treatment until expected damages given non-compliant
treatment, (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp), exceed the cost of compliant treatment, c. Once this con-
dition is met, the MCO will induce compliant treatment and the physician will provide
compliant treatment with some positive probability. As damages increase, this probability
increases until the physician is compliantly treating with near certainty.
Section 7 constructs an e±cient damage rule to analyze the ine±ciencies of two damage
rules courts use to compensate injured patients for their losses.
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Figure 9: This graph illustrates how the physician's treatment decision varies with changes
in the damage level when contracts are observable and compliant treatment costs are less
than ^ c. The graph assumes that the probability of a positive outcome given compliant
treatment is 80%, the probability of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is
40%, litigation costs are $100 and the cost of compliant treatment is $100.
7 Analysis of Damage Rule E±ciency
The purpose of this section is to identify the ine±ciencies of damage rules courts use to
compensate negligently injured patients. The ine±ciencies depend on the disclosure rule.
Section 7.1 begins by suggesting an e±cient damage rule based on the results of Section 5.
Section 7.2 analyzes the e±ciency of two commonly used damage rules: the all-or-nothing
rule and the loss-of-a-chance rule.
7.1 An E±cient Damage Rule
The analysis begins with a calculation of the ¯rst-best solution. Given perfect information,
a social planner would compare total social welfare if the physician provides treatment,52
pH ¡ c, with the total social welfare given the physician does not treat, qH. If the net
bene¯t from treatment is greater than the cost of such treatment ((p ¡ q)H > c), the
social planner would dictate that the physician treat the patient's ailment. On the other
hand, if the net bene¯t from treatment is less than the cost, the social planner would
52For purposes of this section, read \treatment" as the treatment choice that the social planner would
prefer (i.e., the e±cient treatment choice).
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Figure 10: This graph illustrates how the physician's treatment decision varies with
changes in the damage level when contracts are unobservable. The graph assumes that
the probability of a positive outcome given compliant treatment is 80%, the probability
of a positive outcome given non-compliant treatment is 40%, litigation costs are $100 and
the cost of compliant treatment is $200.
require that no treatment be provided.53
This ¯rst-best solution is attainable with perfect information. In health care mar-
kets, however, information is not perfect. Neither the patient nor the MCO can observe
whether the physician treated. To mitigate the negative e®ects of incomplete information,
e±ciency-minded courts can set damages to create incentives for industry actors that lead
to (or at least approximate) ¯rst-best outcomes despite market imperfections. To achieve
an e±cient outcome, the court must set damages such that the actors are faced with the
proper ex ante incentives. The following proposition provides the e±cient damage rule
and resulting equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 5 Regardless of the observability of the contract terms, the following speci-
¯es the e±cient damage rule:
If the net bene¯t from treatment is greater than the cost, the court can approximate ar-
bitrarily the ¯rst-best solution by increasing damages. This results in the MCO employing
a fee-for-service contract with almost full reimbursement for cost, the physician treating
53This cost/bene¯t framework is akin to that articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) and years earlier by Terry [71].
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If the net bene¯t from treatment is less than the cost, the court can achieve the ¯rst-
best solution by setting damages equal to zero. This results in the MCO paying nothing to
the physician, the physician never treating and the patient never suing.
The Appendix provides a proof for this proposition. The intuition for this result is as
follows.54
Consider the case in which the patient can observe the contract terms (see Proposition
1). Recall that the patient will not sue if the physician treats with a su±ciently high
probability (m¤). If treatment is socially desirable, setting damages high55 forces the
physician to treat with near certainty to ensure no litigation. Therefore, the physician
maximizes his expected payo® by treating with near certainty. In addition, Proposition
1 reveals that the MCO uses a fee-for-service contract when expected damages given no
treatment are high relative to the expected cost of treatment. By setting damages high,
the court provides an incentive for the MCO to fully reimburse the physician for the cost
of treatment. Knowing that the physician (almost) always treats, the patient (almost)
never sues.56
When the patient cannot observe the contract terms, the reasoning works in much the
54Grady [27] argues for a cost-bene¯t standard of care to replace the threshold level of care standard.
He also claims that \this new negligence rule is more consistent with the actual decision rules used
by courts than the formal rules posited by the conventional theory." The present study takes no stand
regarding the superiority of the cost-bene¯t standard, but merely employs it to construct a simple and
e±cient damage rule.
It is important to note that constructing the e±cient damage rule is not meant for normative purposes.
Clearly important considerations in addition to e±ciency drive our search for the \perfect" damage rule.
In addition, the model assumes perfect veri¯cation by the court. Assuming otherwise signi¯cantly changes
the construction of the e±cient damage rule. The purpose for articulating an e±cient damage rule in this
section merely is to create a benchmark against which commonly used damage rules can be compared
to study their e®ects on e±ciency. Polinsky and Shavell [60], Hylton [35] and Calfee and Craswell [13]
study the e®ects of legal error on incentives.
55Even though the e±cient rule technically requires in¯nitely high damages to achieve approximate
e±ciency, the level of damages necessary to obtain a reasonable outcome is signi¯cantly lower. Consider
the following example. Assume that treatment is e±cient. This implies that the court wishes to set
damages such that treatment occurs. If the probability of a positive outcome given treatment is 60%, the
probability of a positive outcome given no treatment is 40%, litigation costs equal $10,000 and the cost of
treatment is $4,000, then, by setting damages at $5,000,000, the court can ensure (under the assumptions
of the model) that the physician will treat in nearly 999 out of 1000 cases and injured patients will sue
in approximately 1.3 out of 1000 cases.
56Becker [4] shows that, in criminal cases, an optimal level of punishment exists to balance the goals of
maintaining low crime levels and minimizing enforcement costs (e.g., costs necessary to investigate crimes
and punish o®enders). Becker's analysis di®ers substantially from the analysis of the e±cient damage rule
in the case of medical malpractice. Tort law, in e®ect, is \enforced" by injured parties who internalize
the costs of suing. The administrative costs of the court system are ignored in this study.
In medical malpractice cases, one must be concerned with balancing good outcomes with the cost to
physicians of taking care. These costs imposed on physicians include not only the cost of treatment in
each particular case, but also costs incurred to become a specialist in a particular area, to ful¯ll continuing
education requirements, etc. The e±cient rule constructed in Proposition 5, however, is designed to take
these costs into account. To be e±cient, the rule must specify that the cost of treatment, c, accounts for
all costs necessary to perform a particular treatment, including training, research, etc.
46
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art60same way (see Proposition 2). Just as in the previous case, when damages are high the
physician maximizes his payo® by treating with near certainty. In addition, even though
the patient will always sue with some positive probability, when damages are set high, the
probability that the patient sues is approximately zero because the probability of winning
a lawsuit is approximately zero. Finally, when damages are high relative to treatment
costs, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service arrangement with partial (but almost full)
reimbursement for cost.57 Therefore, in terms of physician and patient behavior, the same
results obtain (approximately) regardless of the observability of the contract terms.
When the cost of treatment exceeds the net bene¯ts it provides, an e±ciency-minded
court discourages treatment by setting damages equal to zero. When damages are zero,
litigation costs exceed expected damages. Therefore, the patient never sues. Knowing
the patient will never sue, the physician never treats and the MCO pays the physician
nothing. The court achieves the ¯rst best outcome. This result is independent of the
observability of the contract.
Many studies investigate the e®ects of defensive medicine: precautions taken by physi-
cians that surpass the standard of care set by custom in order to avoid liability for medical
malpractice.58 The e±cient rule proposed might not help to prevent the practice of de-
fensive medicine unless the costs and bene¯ts of treatment are known with certainty. If
physicians are uncertain about how costs relate to net bene¯ts, they might provide treat-
ment in cases in which the costs of treatment exceed its net bene¯ts. In addition, if the
court is unable to perfectly verify the physician's action, physicians might ¯nd it optimal
to practice defensive medicine.
7.2 Analysis of Commonly Used Damage Rules
Courts in di®erent jurisdictions use di®erent rules to calculate damages when the court
determines that the physician acted negligently (i.e., did not provide customary treatment,
according to this model). Most states use one of two calculations: (1) the all-or-nothing
rule or (2) the loss-of-a-chance rule.59 The all-or-nothing rule allows full compensation
57See the discussion in the appendix for a more detailed explanation of the contract terms under these
circumstances.
58For a review of studies related to the practice of defensive medicine, see McGuire [48].
59Note that some jurisdictions apply a hybrid, using the all-or-nothing rule when the patient's chance
of recovery with treatment exceeds one-half and the loss-of-a-chance rule otherwise. E.g., see Donnini v.
Ouano, 810 P.2d 1163 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). Variations of the two main damage rules are not studied
here.
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of recovery given treatment (i.e., p > :5). Some states that have adopted the loss-of-a-
chance rule determine damages using a single outcome approach suggested by King [39].
Under this approach, the plainti® is awarded damages equal to a portion of the full value
of lost health. The portion is the percentage by which the defendant's tortious conduct
reduced the plainti®'s chance of obtaining a more favorable outcome given treatment. For
example, assume that given treatment, the patient would have had a percent chance, p,
of recovery (with a value of H). Without treatment, however, the patient has a percent
chance, q, of recovery with q strictly less than p. Under this scenario, the plainti® would
be awarded damages of (p¡q)H, the portion of recovery lost due to the physician's failure
to provide proper treatment.
7.2.1 The All-or-Nothing Damage Rule
The purpose of this section is to analyze the e®ect of imposing the all-or-nothing damage
rule on physicians and MCOs that are found liable for medical malpractice.
First consider the case in which litigation costs exceed damages. In this case, the
patient will never sue. Knowing that the patient will not sue, the physician never treats.
If the net expected bene¯t of treatment exceeds its cost, ine±ciency arises in the form of
undertreatment. The same result obtains when damages exceed litigation costs but the
probability of a positive outcome given treatment, p, is at most one-half.
If damages exceed litigation costs and the probability of a positive outcome given
treatment is more than one-half, then ine±ciencies resulting from the all-or-nothing dam-
age rule depend on whether the patient can observe the contract terms. Under these
conditions, the all-or-nothing damage rule requires the court to set damages equal to the
value of health (i.e., Dm + Dp = H).
First consider the case in which the patient can observe the contract terms. In this
case ine±ciencies of some sort result regardless of the relationship between costs and the
expected net bene¯t of treatment. Table 1 lists all cases that could arise under the all-or-
nothing damage rule and the resulting ine±ciencies given that contracts are observable
by the patient, the probability of a positive outcome given treatment is more than one-
half and total damages exceed litigation costs. Note that the expected cost of treatment
under the all-or-nothing rule (m¤
ac) is always less than or equal to the cost of treatment
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damages given no treatment and a lawsuit ((1 ¡ q)H). Following is a summary of all
possible cases assuming that damages exceed litigation costs.
E±cient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
e±cient
(c < (p ¡ q)H)
Treatment is
ine±cient














ac > (1 ¡ q)H) inconsistent conditions litigation costs
Table 1: Ine±ciencies resulting from the all-or-nothing damage rule as compared to the
e±cient damage rule when contracts are observable by the patient, the probability of
a positive outcome given treatment is greater than one-half and total damages exceed
litigation costs.
If the expected cost of treatment (m¤
ac) is low relative to total expected damages under
the all-or-nothing rule ((1¡q)H) and the level of treatment is e±cient, then the physician
will treat with a lower probability than that resulting under the e±cient rule. Under these
conditions, the e±cient damage rule results in (near) certain treatment, whereas the all-
or-nothing rule leads to treatment less often. On the other hand, if treatment is not
e±cient, then the e±cient damage rule calls for no treatment while the all-or-nothing rule
leads to treatment with some positive probability. Therefore, overtreatment occurs. Note
that litigation occurs neither under the e±cient rule nor under the all-or-nothing damage
rule when treatment cost is low relative to total expected damages.
If the expected cost of treatment is high relative to total expected damages under
the all-or-nothing rule, then treatment must be ine±cient.60 Treatment does not occur
under either rule. The e±cient outcome, however, calls for no lawsuits while the actual
outcome under the all-or-nothing damage rule results in the patient suing with certainty.
Therefore, ine±ciencies arise due to litigation costs.
60If m¤
ac > (1 ¡ q)H ) c > (1 ¡ q)H ) c > (p ¡ q)H.
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MCO's decision rule, however, di®ers from the observable contract case.61 Table 2 lists all
cases that could arise under the all-or-nothing damage rule and the resulting ine±cien-
cies given that contracts are not observable by the patient, the probability of a positive
outcome given treatment is more than one-half and total damages exceed litigation costs.
If the cost of treatment (c) is low relative to total expected damages ((1 ¡ q)H)
and treatment is e±cient, the e±cient rule calls for certain treatment and no lawsuit.
The all-or-nothing rule, on the other hand, results in treatment less often and a positive
probability of litigation. Therefore, the physician undertreats and the patient will incur
ine±cient litigation costs. If treatment is ine±cient, then the e±cient rule calls for no
treatment and no lawsuit. The all-or-nothing rule results in some positive probability
of treatment and some positive probability of a lawsuit. Therefore, the patient incurs
ine±cient litigation costs and the physician overtreats.
E±cient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
e±cient
(c < (p ¡ q)H)
Treatment is
ine±cient
(c > (p ¡ q)H)
Treatment cost
relatively low undertreatment; overtreatment;
All-
or-







(c > (1 ¡ q)H)
inconsistent conditions litigation costs
Table 2: Ine±ciencies resulting from the all-or-nothing damage rule as compared to the
e±cient damage rule when contracts are not observable by the patient, the probability
of a positive outcome given treatment is greater than one-half and total damages exceed
litigation costs.
If the cost of treatment exceeds total expected damages, then treatment is ine±cient
for the same reason given in the observable contract case. Neither the all-or-nothing rule
nor the e±cient rule results in treatment. The e±cient outcome, however, calls for no
lawsuits while the actual outcome under this damage rule results in the patient suing with
certainty. Therefore, ine±ciencies arise due to litigation costs.
61Speci¯cally, the MCO compares the cost of treatment (rather than the expected cost of treatment)
to total expected damages when deciding on a contract type.
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rule to compensate injured patients for their losses.
7.2.2 The Loss-of-a-Chance Damage Rule
The purpose of this section is to analyze the e®ect of imposing the loss-of-a-chance damage
rule on physicians and MCOs that are found liable for medical malpractice. Recall that,
under this damage rule, if the injured patient proves medical malpractice, the court awards
the patient the value of the lost chance of recovery attributable to the physician's action
(i.e., (p ¡ q)H). Just as under the all-or-nothing damage rule, if litigation costs exceed
damages and the net expected bene¯t of treatment exceeds its cost, ine±ciency in the
form of undertreatment occurs.
When damages exceed litigation costs, regardless of whether the patient is able to
observe the contract, ine±ciencies arise under all possible circumstances when courts use
the loss-of-a-chance rule to compensate the injured patient. First consider the case in
which the patient is able to observe the contract. Table 3 lists all cases that could arise
under the loss-of-a-chance damage rule and the resulting ine±ciencies given that contracts
are observable by the patient and damages exceed litigation costs. Let m¤
lc represent the
expected cost of treatment under the loss-of-a-chance damage rule.
If the expected cost of treatment (m¤
lc) is less than the MCO's expected damages ((1¡
q)(p¡q)H) and treatment is e±cient, the loss-of-a-chance rule results in a lower probability
of treatment than that resulting under the e±cient damage rule. Conversely, if treatment
is ine±cient, then the loss-of-a-chance rule results in a higher probability of treatment
than the e±cient damage rule produces. Note that these results are similar to those in
an observable contract regime. The unobservability of contracts and the loss-of-a-chance
damage rule, however, change the MCO's contract choice and the equilibrium probability
of treatment. Speci¯cally, decreasing damages lowers the likelihood that the MCO will
employ a fee-for-service contract and, therefore, lowers the probability of treatment.
Next, consider the case in which the expected cost of treatment is high relative to
total expected damages. Unlike the observable contract case, it is possible for treatment
to be e±cient. The e±cient treatment rule calls for certain treatment and no lawsuit. The
loss-of-a-chance rule, on the other hand, results in no treatment and a certain lawsuit.
Therefore, the physician undertreats and the patient incurs ine±cient litigation costs. If
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outcome under this damage rule results in the patient suing with certainty. Therefore,
ine±ciencies arise due to litigation costs. Neither rule results in treatment; therefore, no
ine±ciencies due to treatment emerge.
E±cient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
e±cient
(c < (p ¡ q)H)
Treatment is
ine±cient















lc > (1 ¡ q)(p ¡ q)H) litigation costs
Table 3: Ine±ciencies resulting from the loss-of-a-chance damage rule as compared to
the e±cient damage rule when contracts are observable by the patient and total damages
exceed litigation costs.
When contracts are not observable by the patient, the same ine±ciencies obtain. The
MCO's decision rule, however, di®ers from the cases considered previously. Table 4 lists
all cases that could arise under the loss-of-a-chance damage rule and the resulting in-
e±ciencies given that contracts are not observable by the patient and damages exceed
litigation costs.
If the cost of treatment (c) is less than the MCO's expected damages ((1 ¡ q)(p ¡
q)H), it must be that treatment is e±cient.62 The e±cient rule calls for treatment with
certainty and no lawsuit. The loss-of-a-chance rule, however, leads to a lower probability
of treatment and a positive probability of a lawsuit. Therefore, ine±ciencies in the form
of undertreatment and litigation costs occur.
If the cost of treatment exceeds total expected damages and treatment is e±cient,
then ine±ciencies arise from both litigation and treatment choices. The e±cient rule
leads to certain treatment and no lawsuit. The loss-of-a-chance rule, however, results
in no treatment and a certain lawsuit. Finally, if treatment is ine±cient, the e±cient
outcome calls for no treatment and no lawsuits. While under the loss-of-a-chance rule no
62c < (1 ¡ q)(p ¡ q)H ) c < (p ¡ q)H
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litigation costs.
The next section presents an analysis of how outcomes are a®ected when the court
speci¯es which parties an injured patient is allowed to sue for medical malpractice.
E±cient Damage Rule Outcomes
Treatment is
e±cient
(c < (p ¡ q)H)
Treatment is
ine±cient
(c > (p ¡ q)H)
Loss-
Treatment cost
relatively low undertreatment; inconsistent







(c > (1 ¡ q)(p ¡ q)H) litigation costs
Table 4: Ine±ciencies resulting from the loss-of-a-chance damage rule as compared to the
e±cient damage rule when contracts are not observable by the patient and total damages
exceed litigation costs.
8 Analysis of Tortfeasor Rules
Tortfeasor rules specify the parties that an injured patient can sue to recover for damages
resulting from non-compliant treatment. If the court allows the patient to bring a claim
against both the physician and the MCO, the patient may sue both. On the other hand, if
the court allows suits against only the physician or only the MCO, the patient is restricted
to ¯ling a suit against only one party.63
The following proposition states the relationship between tortfeasor rules and treat-
ment and litigation decisions.
Proposition 6 Neutrality Result: Given any damage rule and any disclosure rule, the
probability that the physician will provide compliant treatment and the probability that an
injured patient will sue do not depend on the tortfeasor rule.
63Traditionally, patients were allowed to bring medical malpractice lawsuits against physicians only.
MCOs, upon being sued, would use the \corporate practice of medicine" doctrine as an a±rmative de-
fense against claims of medical malpractice. States such as Texas, however, have eliminated the corporate
practice of medicine law as a defense for plans. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. x 88.002(h).
Therefore, in recent years, patients have successfully sued both physicians and MCOs for medical mal-
practice (e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d 660 (1990)). An \MCO only" tortfeasor
rule has not been used by any court, but has been analyzed in the literature. See, for example, Polinsky
and Shavell [59].
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result stems from the fact that, regardless of which parties face actual liability, the MCO
must absorb total expected damages to satisfy the physician's individual rationality con-
straint. The model also implicitly assumes that both the MCO and physician are risk
neutral and face no wealth constraints. If these assumptions are relaxed, however, the
result will not hold. For example, if damages imposed on the physician exceed his to-
tal wealth, then the deterrence e®ects of a negligence regime are reduced because the
physician will not ¯nd it in his best interest to treat at the socially optimal level.65
Contracts between MCOs and physicians might contain agreements that grant in-
demni¯cation to the MCO, holding it harmless for liability related to patient treatment
decisions.66 These clauses, however, do not a®ect the neutrality result. Even if an MCO
secures indemni¯cation protection, ex ante it must compensate the physician for expected
damages to satisfy the physician's individual rationality constraint. As the following
proposition shows, however, these clauses might a®ect the MCO's contract choice.
The ¯nal result states the relationship between the tortfeasor rule and the types of
physician contracts employed by MCOs to obtain medical services for their enrollees.
Proposition 7 Given any damage rule, the MCO's choice over contracts depends on the
disclosure rule and the tortfeasor rule in the following way:
If contracts are observable and the expected cost of treatment is less than total expected
damages, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service contract with full reimbursement for cost
regardless of the tortfeasor rule. If the expected cost of treatment exceeds total expected
damages, then the MCO will employ a capitated contract. The ¯xed payment, however,
will depend on the tortfeasor rule. If the patient is allowed to sue the physician, then
the MCO will pay the physician a strictly positive ¯xed payment. Under an MCO-only
tortfeasor rule, however, the physician receives no ¯xed payment.
64This result is consistent with the neutrality results formulated by Kornhauser [41] and Sykes [70]. The
result here, however, generalizes Kornhauser's claim that neutrality will result only if certain instruments
are available to the MCO (i.e., indemni¯cation and/or insurance). behavior. In other words, identical
outcomes result even if the principal is not able to condition wages on outcomes. The Neutrality Result
is based on the notion that the principal must compensate the agent through the wage contract in
order for the physician to accept exposure to liability. Therefore, regardless of the tortfeasor rule, the
principal always incurs the cost of ex ante exposure to liability and induces the agent to perform. Arlen
and MacLeod [2] demonstrate a similar result in the context of physician expertise and delegation of
authority to physicians by MCOs.
65See Kornhauser [41] and Sykes [70] for detailed discussions of circumstances under which the neu-
trality result does not hold.
66Morgan and Levy [52] summarize legislative rules regarding \hold harmless" clauses on a state-by-
state basis.
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ages, the tortfeasor rule a®ects contract types as follows. If the patient is able to sue both
the physician and the MCO, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service contract with par-
tial reimbursement and a strictly positive ¯xed payment. If the patient is able to sue the
physician only, the MCO will employ a capitated contract with a positive ¯xed payment
equal to the cost of treatment. If the patient is able to sue the MCO only, the MCO will
employ a fee-for-service contract with full reimbursement and no ¯xed payment. If the
cost of treatment exceeds total expected damages, the result is identical to the observable
contract case. That is, the MCO will employ a capitated contract with the ¯xed payment
depending on the tortfeasor rule. If the patient is allowed to sue the physician, then the
MCO must pay a strictly positive ¯xed payment to the physician. Under an MCO-only
tortfeasor rule, however, the physician receives no ¯xed payment.
This result also follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. It shows that, even though
the tortfeasor rule does not a®ect treatment and litigation outcomes, it will a®ect how
the MCO structures its contract with the physician to in°uence treatment decisions and
maximize its payo®.
The intuition behind the case in which contracts are observable is fairly straightfor-
ward. When treatment costs are relatively low, the MCO will employ a fee-for-service
contract with full reimbursement for cost regardless of the tortfeasor rule. This is the case
because lawsuits never occur. Therefore, the physician is not exposed to damages, and
the MCO must pay him the full cost of treatment to guarantee treatment at a level such
that the patient never sues. When treatment costs are relatively high, the MCO employs
a capitated contract with a ¯xed payment to cover the physician's exposure to liability.
If the tortfeasor rule exposes the physician to potential liability, then the ¯xed payment
will be strictly positive. On the other hand, if the tortfeasor rule allows suits against only
the MCO, the ¯xed payment to the physician will be zero.
Next, consider the case in which contracts are not observable. If the cost of treatment is
relatively low and the tortfeasor rule allows suits against both the MCO and the physician,
the MCO employs a fee-for-service contract with partial reimbursement for treatment costs
and a ¯xed payment to cover the physician's exposure to liability given no treatment.
Recall that the MCO can reduce the reimbursement amount because the physician has
some incentive to treat resulting from his exposure to liability. The MCO, however, will
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MCO's perspective) to reduce its exposure to liability. If an injured patient is allowed
to sue the physician only, the MCO will not reimburse for treatment, but will pay a
¯xed payment equal to the cost of treatment, which, in this case, is exactly equal to the
physician's liability exposure given no treatment. If, on the other hand, an injured patient
is allowed to sue only the MCO, the physician has no incentive to treat based on liability
exposure. The MCO must fully reimburse treatment costs but is not required to pay any
¯xed payment. If the cost of treatment is relatively high, contracts under an unobservable
contract regime look identical to those under an observable contract regime.
9 Conclusion and Extensions
The model and its results provide insights with respect to policy surrounding medical
malpractice. First, the observability of contracts matters. Although the motivation for
forcing disclosure of contracts to potential or present MCO enrollees is to provide informa-
tion during the MCO selection process, policy makers should weigh the potential e®ects
of disclosure on contract, treatment and litigation decisions. In addition, judges and
legislators should consider carefully the deterrence e®ects of medical malpractice damage
rules and judiciously contemplate how changes in these rules a®ect behavior in health care
markets. Finally, market conditions in°uence the e®ects of tortfeasor rules on behavior.
These rules might help to explain the con¯guration of contracts used in the market and
the variations across jurisdictions.
The model leads to several testable predictions. First, given that reliable measure-
ments of physician treatment choices and patient ¯ling rates are available, empirical tests
of the e®ects of disclosure and damage rules on contracts, treatment and litigation deci-
sions are possible.67 In addition, testing whether treatment and litigation decisions are
a®ected by tortfeasor rules might lead to the discovery of other market conditions that
give tortfeasor rules some bite. Finally, one could test whether variations in tortfeasor
rules explain variations in the portfolio of contracts employed in di®erent jurisdictions.
Strong caveats apply. The practical use of the model's results to create policy is
severely limited by many of its assumptions. First, relaxing the assumption that courts
67See Zeiler [73] for an empirical investigation of how disclosure laws and damage caps a®ect expected
damages due to medical malpractice.
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damage rule. If courts sometimes err, imposing heavy penalties on physicians and MCOs
might encourage injured patients to sue when a lawsuit is not socially optimal. Even if
damages are set high so that the physician treats with near certainty, the patient might
sue to take advantage of the small chance that the court mistakenly ¯nds the physician
liable. Extending the model to account for the e®ect of court error on the e±cient damage
rule might be a useful exercise.
Second, the model does not account for the e®ects of competition among MCOs for
enrollees. In addition, the fact that enrollees might voluntarily separate themselves into
various types of plans is not considered here.68 Although these assumptions do not a®ect
the general intuitions of the model, considering competition and enrollee choice could
o®er additional insights.
Finally, the model focuses on behavior given that one patient in need of treatment
seeks medical care. Therefore, the use of contracts by MCOs to share risk with physicians
is not considered here. MCO-physician contracts, however, do play a role in the sharing of
risk among actors in health care markets. The explanation behind contract composition
within a particular jurisdiction must take this motivation into account.
In sum, policy makers should be wary about using the results provided here to con-
struct remedies for the imperfections of health care markets. The analysis is just one step
toward understanding the very complex nature of health care markets. Until the basic
elements of behavior are well understood, however, we run the risk of designing policies
leading to perverse behavior by market actors.
68See, e.g., Jackson-Beeck and Kleinman [36], Lairson and Herd [43] and Scotti et al. [66], all analyzing
how patients separate themselves among types of managed care plans.
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A.1 Notation
p represents the probability that a positive outcome results given that the physician
provides compliant treatment.
q represents the probability that a positive outcome results given that the physician
provides non-compliant treatment.
¯ 2 [0;1] represents the probability that the physician provides compliant treatment.
° 2 [0;1] represents the probability that the patient decides to ¯le a medical malpractice
claim given a negative outcome.
® 2 [0;1] represents the patient's belief that the physician provided compliant treatment
given a negative outcome.
f represents the ¯xed wage paid by the MCO to the physician. Assume f ¸ 0.
r represents the amount paid by the MCO to reimburse the physician for treatment costs.
Assume r ¸ 0.
· = (r;f) represents a contract chosen by the MCO.
c represents the cost incurred by the physician to provide compliant treatment. Assume
c > 0 if physician provides compliant treatment and c = 0 if not.
L represents the fees incurred by the patient to ¯le and pursue a claim. Assume L > 0.
Dm represents the damages awarded by the court to be paid by the MCO to the patient.
Assume Dm ¸ 0.
Dp represents the damages awarded by the court to be paid by the physician to the
patient. Assume Dp ¸ 0. Let D = Dm + Dp.
H represents the value of health to the patient if a positive outcome is realized. Assume
H > 0.
I represents the insurance premium paid by the patient to the MCO to insure against
uncertain health care costs.
A represents ex ante expected damages.
um represents the ex ante expected payout to the MCO.
up represents the ex ante expected payout to the physician.
ui represents the ex ante expected payout to the patient.
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http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art60A.2 Equilibrium when Contracts Are Observable by the Patient
This section provides proofs for claims made in the case when the contract formed between
the MCO and the physician is observable by the patient. Proofs are given for the case in
which patients are allowed to sue both the MCO and the physician for medical malpractice.
The proofs, however, are general and can be modi¯ed easily to develop claims for the
other tortfeasor rules: (1) patient can sue physician only (set Dm = 0 in all cases), and
(2) patient can sue MCO only (set Dp = 0 in all cases). Also, results are given for the case
in which total damages exceed litigation costs. When they do not, the patient will never
sue, MCOs will pay nothing to the physician and the physician will never compliantly
treat.69 The ¯rst step in solving for the equilibrium is to analyze the strategies of the
patient and physician.
A.2.1 Best Response of Patient to Physician Action
Claim 1 Taking ¯, q, Dm, Dp, and L as given, the patient's best response to the physi-
cian's strategy is as follows:
If ¯ < m, then the patient sues (°¤ = 1) .
If ¯ = m, then the patient is indi®erent (°¤ 2 [0;1]).




Proof: Let ® represent the patient's belief that the physician compliantly treated given
a negative outcome. Speci¯cally, ® =
¯(1¡p)
¯(1¡p)+(1¡¯)(1¡q). If the patient chooses not to ¯le
a claim, her payo® is simply zero. On the other hand, if the patient ¯les and pursues
a claim, her expected payo® is (1 ¡ ®)(Dm + Dp) ¡ L: Therefore, the patient will sue
if and only if (1 ¡ ®)(Dm + Dp) > L. Substituting for ® gives sue if and only if ¯ <
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)+)(1¡p)L. ¥
A.2.2 Best Response of Physician to Patient Action
Claim 2 Taking °, r, f, c, q and Dp as given, the physician's best response to the patient's
strategy is as follows:
If ° > c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, then the physician provides compliant treatment (¯¤ = 1).
If ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, then the physician is indi®erent (¯¤ 2 [0;1]).
69The case in which damages equal litigation costs is similarly uninteresting and is not considered here.
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(1¡q)Dp, then the physician does not provide compliant treatment (¯¤ = 0).
Proof: If the physician decides to provide compliant treatment, his payo® will be f +r¡c.
In the event the physician does not, his expected payo® will be f ¡(1¡q)°Dp. Therefore,
the physician will provide compliant treatment if and only if r ¡ c > ¡(1 ¡ q)°Dp.
Therefore, ° > c¡r
(1¡q)Dp , ¯ = 1. ¥
A.2.3 Equilibrium of Patient and Physician Behavior
Claim 3 Taking r, f, c, q, Dm, Dp, and L as given, the equilibrium of patient and
physician behavior and best responses to the MCO's reimbursement terms are as follows:
If r > c, then ¯¤ = 1 and °¤ = 0.
If r = c ¡ °(1 ¡ q)Dp, then (a) ¯¤ 2 (m;1] and °¤ = 0, or
(b) ¯¤ = m and °¤ = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, or
(c) ¯¤ 2 [0;m) and °¤ = 1.




Proof: Given patient and physician best responses, consider the possible cases:
(1) ¯ = 1 and ° = 1. ¯ = 1 ) ® = 1. Therefore, ° = 1 implies L < 0, a contradiction.
(2) ¯ = 1 and ° 2 [0;1]. ¯ = 1 ) ® = 1. Therefore, ° 2 [0;1] implies L = 0, a
contradiction.
(3) ¯ = 1 and ° = 0. ¯ = 1 ) ® = 1. Therefore, ° = 0 implies L > 0, an assumption
of the model. Note that ° = 0 implies c¡r
(1¡q)Dp < 0 ) r > c.
(4) ¯ 2 [0;1] and ° = 0. These conditions imply r = c and ® >
Dm+Dp¡L
Dm+Dp . It is
possible to meet both conditions. Substituting for ® gives ¯ >
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)+(1¡p)L.
(5) ¯ 2 [0;1] and ° 2 [0;1]. These conditions imply ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp and ® =
Dm+Dp¡L
Dm+Dp . It
is possible to meet both conditions. Substituting for ® gives ¯ =
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)+(1¡p)L.
(6) ¯ 2 [0;1] and ° = 1. These conditions imply r = c¡(1¡q)Dp and ® <
Dm+Dp¡L
Dm+Dp .
It is possible to meet both conditions. Substituting for ® gives ¯ <
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)+(1¡p)L.
(7) ¯ = 0 and ° = 1. These conditions imply r < c ¡(1¡q)Dp and ® <
Dm+Dp¡L
Dm+Dp . It
is possible to meet both conditions.
(8) ¯ = 0 and ° 2 [0;1]. ¯ = 0 ) ® = 0. This condition implies
Dm+Dp¡L
Dm+Dp = 0, a
contradiction.
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Dm+Dp¡L
Dm+Dp < 0, a
contradiction. ¥
A.2.4 MCO's Best Response to Physician and Patient Behavior and Result-
ing Equilibrium Contracts
Proposition 1 Taking c, q, L, Dm and Dp as given, the equilibrium contracts, resulting
equilibrium behavior of the patient and the physician and expected payouts are as follows:
(1) If mc < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp), then ·¤ = (c;0) with ¯¤ = m, °¤ = 0, um = I ¡ mc,
up = 0 and ui = mpH + (1 ¡ m)qH ¡ I.
(2) If mc > (1 ¡ q)(Dp + Dm), then ·¤ = (r¤ · c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp;(1 ¡ q)Dp) with ¯¤ = 0
and °¤ = 1, um = I ¡(1¡q)(Dm+Dp), up = 0 and ui = qH +(1¡q)(Dm+Dp ¡L)¡I.
Proof: The MCO will solve the following maximization problem.
max
(f;r)
I ¡ f ¡ ¯
¤r ¡ (1 ¡ ¯
¤)(1 ¡ q)°
¤Dm












¤°(¡L) + (1 ¡ ¯
¤)°(Dm + Dp ¡ L)
Consider each case presented in Claim 3:
(1) If the MCO sets r > c, then ¯¤ = 1 and °¤ = 0. To meet the physician's IR
constraint, however, the MCO must set f = c ¡ r < 0, which violates the assumption
that f ¸ 0. Therefore, this contract is unfeasible.
(2) If the MCO sets r = c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp, consider the following:
(a) ¯¤ > m and °¤ = 0
Given that the patient does not sue, r¤ = c. To meet the physician's IR constraint,
the MCO must set f¤ = ¯(c ¡ r) = 0. Because the physician is indi®erent between all
e®ort levels above m, the e®ort level is set to optimize the MCO's payo®. Speci¯cally,
the MCO will solve the following problem: max¯>m I ¡ ¯c. The MCO prefers the lowest
70Note that, in equilibrium, the MCO will set the ¯xed payment, f, and the reimbursement amount, r,
so that up = 0. Therefore, the maximization problem is solved assuming that the constraint is binding.
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(" small) ) um ! I ¡ mc (from below).
(b) ¯¤ = m and °¤ = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp
In this case the MCO sets r¤ = c¡(1¡q)°Dp and f¤ = m(c¡r)+(1¡m)(c¡r) = c¡r.
This contract provides
um = I ¡ (c ¡ r) ¡ mr ¡ (1 ¡ m)
(c ¡ r)Dm
Dp
= I ¡ c + r ¡ mr ¡ (1 ¡ m)c
Dm
Dp
+ (1 ¡ m)r
Dm
Dp
= I ¡ c ¡ (1 ¡ m)c
Dm
Dp




um is increasing in r. Therefore, the MCO prefers to set r as high as possible given that
° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp and ° ¸ 0. Therefore, the MCO will set r¤ = c and f¤ = 0. In equilibrium,
¯¤ = m and °¤ = 0 resulting in um = I ¡ mc.
(c) ¯¤ < m and °¤ = 1
Under these conditions, r¤ = c¡(1¡q)Dp and f¤ = (1¡q)Dp. Because the physician
is indi®erent between all e®ort levels below m, the e®ort level is set to optimize the MCO's
payo®. Speci¯cally, it will solve the following problem:
max
¯<m
I ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp ¡ ¯(c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q)Dm =
I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) + ¯((1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) ¡ c)
Therefore, the MCO's preferred probability of treatment depends on the relationship
between c and (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp):
(i) If c < (1¡q)(Dm +Dp) ) the MCO prefers ¯ = m¡" and um = I ¡(1¡q)Dp ¡
(m ¡ ")(c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp) ¡ (1 ¡ (m ¡ "))(1 ¡ q)Dm ! I ¡ mc ¡ (1 ¡ m)(1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp).
(ii) If c = (1¡q)(Dm +Dp) ) MCO is indi®erent between all ¯ < m (say ¯ = l) and
um = I ¡ lc ¡ (1 ¡ l)(1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) = I ¡ c.
(iii) If c > (1¡q)(Dm+Dp) ) the MCO prefers ¯ = 0 and um = I¡(1¡q)(Dm+Dp).
(3) If the MCO sets r < c¡(1¡q)Dp, then ¯¤ = 0 and °¤ = 1. To satisfy the physician's
IR constraint, the MCO must set f¤ = (1¡q)Dp. This results in um = I¡(1¡q)(Dm+Dp).
To summarize:
When c < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp):
² If · = (c;0), then um = I ¡ mc.
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² If · = (r < c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp;(1 ¡ q)Dp), then um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dp + Dm).
Therefore, the MCO will maximize its payo® by employing · = (c;0).
When c = (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp):
² If · = (c;0), then um = I ¡ mc.
² If · = (c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp;(1 ¡ q)Dp), then um = I ¡ c.
² If · = (r < c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp;(1 ¡ q)Dp), then um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dp + Dm).
Therefore, the MCO will maximize its payo® by employing · = (c;0).
When c > (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp):
² If · = (c;0), then um = I ¡ mc.
² If · = (c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp;(1 ¡ q)Dp), then um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dp + Dm).
² If · = (r < c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp;(1 ¡ q)Dp), then um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dp + Dm).
Therefore, if mc < (1¡q)(Dp+Dm), then the MCO will maximize its payo® by employing
· = (c;0). On the other hand, if mc > (1 ¡ q)(Dp + Dm), then the MCO will maximize
its payo® by employing · = (r · c ¡ (1 ¡ q)Dp;(1 ¡ q)Dp). ¥
A.3 Equilibrium when Contracts Are not Observable by the
Patient
This section provides proofs for claims made in the case when the contract formed between
the MCO and the physician is not observable by the patient. Just as in the observable
contract case, the following proofs apply to the case in which the patient is allowed to
sue both the physician and the MCO for medical malpractice. The claims and proofs
can be modi¯ed, however, to analyze the remaining tortfeasor rules: (1) patient can sue
physician only (set Dm = 0 in all cases) and (2) patient can sue MCO only (set Dp = 0
in all cases).
Solving this case for the equilibrium proceeds in much the same way as in the case
with observable contracts. The patient, however, cannot observe the contract terms.
Therefore, the MCO best responds only to the physician's strategy.
A.3.1 MCO's Best Response to the Physician's Strategy
Claim 4 Taking c, p, q, Dm, Dp, L and ° as given, the MCO's best response to the
physician's strategy is as follows:
If ° > c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp), then the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · =
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If ° = c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp), then the MCO is indi®erent between: (1) setting (r;f) such that
° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = ( cDm
Dm+Dp;
cDp
Dm+Dp) with ¯ 2 [0;1] and (2) setting (r;f) such that
° < c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (r < cDm
Dm+Dp;
cDp
Dm+Dp) with ¯ = 0. Both contracts result in
um = I ¡ c = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp).
If ° < c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp), then the MCO is indi®erent between: (1) setting (r;f) such that
° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp;(1 ¡ q)°Dp) with ¯ = 0 and (2) setting (r;f)
such that ° < c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (r < c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp;(1 ¡ q)°Dp) with ¯ = 0. Both
contracts result in um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp).
Proof: Consider the MCO's decision regarding which contract to utilize to obtain physician
services given a ¯xed probability ° that the patient will sue if a negative outcome occurs.
Taking c, p, q, Dm, Dp, L and ° as given, the MCO will solve the following problem:
max
(r;f)
I ¡ f ¡ ¯
¤r ¡ (1 ¡ ¯
¤)(1 ¡ q)°Dm
subject to (1) f + ¯
¤(r ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯






¤ ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q)°Dp
Recall from Claim 2 that the cuto® point for physician action is ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp. That is,
if the probability that the patient will sue given a negative outcome is greater than this
cuto® point, the physician will provide compliant treatment. This cuto® point is a choice
variable for the MCO: when it selects an amount to reimburse the physician, it ¯xes the
cuto® point. Consider the following cases based on the physician's strategy in Claim 2
given a ¯xed °:
(1) If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° > c¡r
(1¡q)Dp ) ¯¤ = 1. In other words, if the MCO
sets r > c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp, the physician will provide compliant treatment with certainty.
The MCO's maximization problem becomes max(f;r) I ¡ f ¡ r subject to f + r = c. To
meet the physician's IR constraint, the MCO must provide f = c ¡ r < 0, which violates
an assumption of the model. Therefore, this contract is unfeasible.
(2) If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp ) ¯¤ 2 [0;1]. In other words, if the
MCO sets r = c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp, the physician will be indi®erent between all e®ort levels.
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I ¡ f ¡ ¯(c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q)°Dm
subject to f = (1 ¡ q)°Dp
Substituting for f gives
max
¯
I ¡ ¯c ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp)
max
¯
¯((1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) ¡ c):
The MCO's decision will depend on how the cost of compliant treatment relates to ex
ante expected total damages given non-compliant treatment:
(a) If c < (1¡q)°(Dm +Dp) (or ° > c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)), then ¯ = 1 maximizes the MCO's
payo®. Therefore, the contract will specify r = c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp and f = (1 ¡ q)°Dp.
¯ = 1 ) um = I ¡ c.
(b) If c = (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) (or ° = c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)), then the MCO is indi®erent
between all values of ¯. Therefore, the contract will specify r = c¡ (1 ¡q)°Dp = cDm
Dm+Dp
and f = (1 ¡ q)°Dp =
cDp
Dm+Dp and







) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q)(
c








) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)
cDm
Dm + Dp
= I ¡ c = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp)
(c) If c > (1¡q)°(Dm +Dp) (or ° < c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)), then ¯ = 0 maximizes the MCO's
payo®. Therefore, the contract will specify r = c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp and f = (1 ¡ q)°Dp.
¯ = 0 ) um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp).
(3) If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° < c¡r
(1¡q)Dp ) ¯ = 0. In other words, if the
MCO sets r < c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp, the physician will not compliantly treat. The MCO's
maximization problem becomes maxf I ¡ f ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dm subject to f = (1 ¡ q)°Dp.
Therefore, the contract will specify any r < c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp and f = (1 ¡ q)°Dp. This
implies um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp).
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When c < (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) (or ° > c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)):
² If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (c¡(1¡q)°Dp;(1¡q)°Dp),
then um = I ¡ c with ¯ = 1.
² If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° < c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (r < c¡(1¡q)°Dp;(1¡q)°Dp),
then um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) with ¯ = 0.
Therefore, the MCO will maximize its payo® by setting (r;f) such that ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp and
employing · = (c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp;(1 ¡ q)°Dp) with ¯ = 1.
When c = (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) (or ° = c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)):
² If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° = c¡r




um = I ¡ c = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) with ¯ 2 [0;1].
² If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° < c¡r




um = I ¡ c = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) with ¯ = 0.
Therefore, the MCO is indi®erent between the two contracts.
When c > (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) (or ° < c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)):
² If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (c¡(1¡q)°Dp;(1¡q)°Dp),
then um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) with ¯ = 0.
² If the MCO sets (r;f) such that ° < c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (r < c¡(1¡q)°Dp;(1¡q)°Dp),
then um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp) with ¯ = 0.
Therefore, the MCO is indi®erent between the two contracts. ¥
A.3.2 Equilibrium Contracts
Proposition 2 Taking c, p, q, Dm, Dp and L as given, the equilibrium contracts, result-
ing equilibrium behavior of the patient and the physician and payo®s are as follows:




¯¤ = m and °¤ = c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp) resulting in um = I ¡ c, up = 0 and ui = mpH + (1 ¡
m)qH + m(1 ¡ p) c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp)(¡L) + (1 ¡ m)
c(Dm+Dp¡L)
(Dm+Dp) ¡ I.
(2) If c > (1¡q)(Dm +Dp), then the MCO will employ ·¤ = (r¤ < c¡(1¡q)Dp;(1¡
q)Dp) with ¯¤ = 0 and °¤ = 1 resulting in um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp), up = 0 and
ui = qH + (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp ¡ L) ¡ I.
Proof: Equilibrium contracts are found by considering the patient's best response to
resulting physician behavior given the contract chosen by the MCO. Take c, p, q, Dm, Dp
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(1) If ° > c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp), then · = (c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp;(1 ¡ q)°Dp) with ¯ = 1.
¯ = 1 implies ° = 0 (see Claim 3). Substituting ° = 0 into ° > c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp) gives
0 > c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp), a violation of the assumptions of the model. Therefore, this contract is
not possible in equilibrium.
(2) If ° = c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp), consider the two contracts speci¯ed in Claim 4:
(a) The MCO sets (r;f) such that ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = ( cDm
Dm+Dp;
cDp
Dm+Dp) with ¯ 2
[0;1]. When ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, however, in equilibrium ¯ = m, where m =
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)+(1¡p)L
(see Claim 3). This constitutes an equilibrium contract with um = I ¡ c.
(b) The MCO sets (r;f) such that ° < c¡r




with ¯ = 0. In equilibrium, ¯ = 0 implies ° = 1 (see Claim 3). Note that ° = 1
implies c = (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp). Therefore, this constitutes an equilibrium contract with
um = I ¡ c = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp).
(3) If c > (1 ¡ q)°(Dm + Dp), consider the two contracts speci¯ed in Claim 5:
(a) The MCO sets (r;f) such that ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (c¡(1¡q)°Dp;(1¡q)°Dp)
with ¯ = 0. When ° = c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, however, in equilibrium ¯ = m > 0; therefore, this
contract is not possible in equilibrium.
(b) The MCO sets (r;f) such that ° < c¡r
(1¡q)Dp, namely · = (r < c ¡ (1 ¡ q)°Dp;(1 ¡
q)°Dp) with ¯ = 0. In equilibrium, ¯ = 0 implies ° = 1. This constitutes an equilibrium
contract with um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp).
To summarize:
If c < (1¡q)(Dm+Dp), then the MCO will employ ·¤ = ( cDm
Dm+Dp;
cDp
Dm+Dp) with ¯¤ = m
and °¤ = c
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp) resulting in um = I ¡ c.
If c > (1¡q)(Dm+Dp), then the MCO will employ ·¤ = (r¤ < c¡(1¡q)Dp;(1¡q)Dp)
with ¯¤ = 0 and °¤ = 1 resulting in um = I ¡ (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp). ¥
A.3.3 E®ect of Disclosure Rules on the Likelihood of Lawsuits
Let °o represent the probability that an injured patient will ¯le a claim when contracts
are observable and °u represent the probability of an injured patient ¯ling a claim when
contracts are unobservable.
Proposition 3 Given any feasible point (c;p;q;L;Dm;Dp), °o · °u.
Proof: Consider each possible case given Dm + Dp > L:
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(1¡q)(Dm+Dp) > 0. Therefore,
°o < °u.
(2) If mc < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) < c, then °o = 0 and °u = 1. Therefore, °o < °u.
(3) If (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) < mc < c, then °o = 1 and °u = 1. Therefore, °o = °u.
If Dm + Dp < L, then the patient never sues. Therefore, °o = °u.¥
A.3.4 E®ect of Disclosure Rules on the Likelihood of Treatment
Let ¯o represent the probability that the physician will provide compliant treatment when
contracts are observable and ¯u represent the probability of compliant treatment when
contracts are unobservable.
Proposition 4 Given any feasible point (c;p;q;L;Dm;Dp), ¯o ¸ ¯u.
Proof: Consider each possible case given Dm + Dp > L:
(1) If mc < c < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp), then ¯o = m and ¯u = m. Therefore, ¯o = ¯u.
(2) If mc < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) < c, then ¯o = m and ¯u = 0. Therefore, ¯o > ¯u.
(3) If (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp) < mc < c, then ¯o = 0 and ¯u = 0. Therefore, ¯o = ¯u.
If Dm + Dp < L, then the physician never compliantly treats. Therefore, ¯o = ¯u.¥
A.4 The E±cient Damage Rule
Proposition 5 Regardless of the observability of the contract terms, the following speci-
¯es the e±cient damage rule:
If (p¡q)H > c, the court can approximate arbitrarily the ¯rst-best solution by increas-
ing damages. This results in ·¤ = (c;0), ¯¤ ! 1 and °¤ ! 0.
If (p ¡ q)H < c, the court can achieve the ¯rst-best solution by setting Dm + Dp = 0.
This results in ·¤ = (0;0), ¯¤ = 0 and °¤ = 0.
Proof: Consider the case in which contracts are observable by the patient and treatment
maximizes social welfare. Recall that the patient's cut-o® point is m =
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)
(1¡q)(Dm+Dp¡L)+(1¡p)L.
By setting Dp ! 1 and Dm ! 1, the physician treats with (near) certainty as m ! 1.
Because the physician is treating at the patient's cut-o® point, the patient will never sue.
Also, large damage amounts result in mc < (1¡q)Dm+Dp. Therefore, the MCO employs
a fee-for-service contract with full reimbursement to maximize its payo® (see Proposition
1). The socially optimal outcome (treating with certainty and no lawsuit) is approximated
when the court sets damages high.
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As in the observable contract case, by setting damages high, the court encourages the
physician to treat with (near) certainty as limDm+Dp!1 m = 1. Likewise, when the court
sets damages high, the patient is discouraged from suing as limDm+Dp!1 ° = 0. Finally,
when damages are high, c < (1 ¡ q)(Dm + Dp). According to Proposition 2, the contract
terms will depend on the relative rates at which damages against the MCO and damages
against the physician increase.71
If social welfare is maximized when the physician does not treat (i.e., (p ¡ q)H < c),
the analysis is the same regardless of the observability of the contract terms. The court
will set damages so that no treatment is provided and the patient does not sue. This is
accomplished by setting damages equal to zero (i.e., Dm = 0 and Dp = 0). When damages
are equal to zero, the patient will never sue because litigation costs (L) exceed expected
damages. Knowing that the patient will not sue, the MCO will pay the physician nothing
and the physician will not treat.
71This characteristic of the model is merely a feature of its assumptions. Intuitively, when both
physician and MCO damage amounts are high, the MCO must pay the physician the cost of treatment.
This payment can be split in any way between the reimbursement amount and the ¯xed payment. The
MCO is indi®erent between the various splits because high physician damages provide the physician with
an incentive to treat. The payment from the MCO merely satis¯es his individual rationality constraint.
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